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Abstract
Inspired by e-participation systems, in this paper we propose a new model
to represent human debates and methods to obtain collective conclusions
from them. This model overcomes drawbacks of existing approaches by al-
lowing users to introduce new pieces of information into the discussion, to
relate them to existing pieces, and also to express their opinion on the pieces
proposed by other users. In addition, our model does not assume that users’
opinions are rational in order to extract information from it, an assump-
tion that significantly limits current approaches. Instead, we define a weaker
notion of rationality that characterises coherent opinions, and we consider
different scenarios based on the coherence of individual opinions and the
level of consensus that users have on the debate structure. Considering these
two factors, we analyse the outcomes of different opinion aggregation func-
tions that compute a collective decision based on the individual opinions and
the debate structure. In particular, we demonstrate that aggregated opinions
can be coherent even if there is a lack of consensus and individual opinions
are not coherent. We conclude our analysis with a computational evalua-
tion demonstrating that collective opinions can be computed efficiently for
real-sized debates.
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1. Introduction
We live in challenging times. With the rise of artificial intelligence and
the looming climate emergency, it is no exaggeration to say that humanity is
facing several simultaneous existential crises. At the same time, traditional
democracy is being undermined by falling participation [48, 91]. In response
there have been calls [1, 39, 83] for new ways to tighten the relationship
between political institutions and the citizens they represent. Social networks
and the palpable impact they had in society have inspired new technologies
aiming to improve this relationship — e-governance, or more specifically e-
participation systems [42]. These are systems that are designed to allow
citizens to propose, discuss, and even decide, government policy through
online platforms.
Significant examples of deployed e-participation systems are those used by
the city governments of Barcelona [30], Reykjavik [16], Madrid [29], Helsinki
[25], and the one used by the French government [69]. In these systems,
participants can carry out structured discussions around some issue. For ex-
ample the systems deployed by Barcelona, Reykjavik, Madrid, and Helsinki
are for proposals about local issues, while the French government system,
Parlement et Citoyens, is for the discussion of potential national legislation.
Turning to systems that are not tied to a specific institution, there are tools
such as consider.it [26], Appgree [4] and Baoqu [9] whose main focus is scal-
ability — making the systems fit for use by large numbers of participants.
Several methodologies have been already explored as a means to tackle
this problem. Social choice theory [8, 57] is an approach for establishing
the collective opinion of a group facing a choice between many alternatives.
Given a set of alternatives and a set of agents who possess preference relations
over the alternatives, social choice theory focuses on how to yield a collective
choice that appropriately reflects the agents’ individual preferences. A re-
lated approach, but one which focuses on the acceptability of a single issue,
is judgement aggregation. This tackles the problem of whether to collectively
accept a single issue once the participants have put forward their opinion on
it [38, 58]. A further approach, one that focuses more on resolving conflicts
in opinions, is computational argumentation [76]. Given a set of arguments
for particular options, and a set of attack relations (conflicts) between the ar-
guments, argumentation is concerned with identifying those arguments that
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might be accepted by a rational agent (for different ideas of what makes an
argument acceptable). Mixing judgement aggregation or social choice theory
together with argumentation we find several proposals that structure debates
using arguments and attack relationships, such as [7, 56], or attack and de-
fence (or support) relationships [46]. These allow participants to put forward
arguments, relations between arguments, and opinions about which of these
arguments and relations hold. They then produce an output that is intended
to reflect the collective opinion of the participants on the the debate.
This article proposes a new formal model, which we call the “relational
model”, to structure the information in a debate while allowing more expres-
siveness than existing approaches permit, both in terms of the structure of
the debate, and in terms of the opinions expressed by participants. We pro-
pose several methods for aggregating the information of the debate captured
by the model to obtain an output reflecting the collective view of the partic-
ipants involved. Furthermore, we analyse the performance of such methods
with respect to several social choice properties adapted from those proposed
in the social choice literature. Finally, we study the computational properties
of the aggregation methods to establish whether it is feasible to use them in
practice.
In more detail the contributions of this work are:
- Increasing expressiveness. Collective decision-making frameworks based
on traditional argumentation models usually take as starting point a
fixed argumentation structure that only model attack relationships be-
tween arguments or a combination of attack and support/defence re-
lationships between arguments. These frameworks then allow partic-
ipants to express opinions about the different arguments included in
the debate [7, 46, 56]. The fixed nature of the argumentation struc-
ture, even if it is defined by the participants, represents a significant
drawback for e-participation systems. Adopting a fixed argumenta-
tion structure using only attacks, or attacks plus supports/defences,
reduces what participants are allowed to express. For instance, a fixed
attack relationship between two arguments might be problematic for
some participants who disagree on the classification of the relationship
as an attack and would have defined the same relationship as a de-
fence. To solve this problem, our model uses relationships that are not
subjectively classified as attacks or defences, but only represent the
connections between elements of the debate. The subjective classifica-
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tion is applied individually by each participant not in terms of attack
or defence, but in terms of acceptability of the connections. Thus, the
structure of the debate is focused on organising relevant information,
not on expressing the subjective opinion of the participants, which is
added separately using other tools.
- Going beyond abstract argumentation. Several approaches [7, 28, 56]
make use of abstract argumentation frameworks [35], or some varia-
tions of them, as in [46], to represent the elements of a debate. In
such frameworks, whole arguments are the atomic elements. In work
on argumentation, this limitation has led to work on “structured” [65]
or “rule-based” [47] argumentation which constructs arguments out of
lower level components like facts and rules. Since we believe that a
debate can hinge on being able to address such lower level components,
we take a similar, but more general, approach. We construct debates
from two types of abstract objects: statements, which represent sen-
tences without reasoning, and the relationships between statements,
which represent the existing reasoning connecting the statements1. We
make a sharp distinction between these two types of information, state-
ments and reasoning connecting statements, in order to allow them to
be subsequently evaluated in different manners by the participants.
- Compound and real valued opinions. Previous work on argumentation-
based approaches has only allowed participants in a debate to express
opinions about either the arguments [46, 56], or about the relation-
ships between arguments [37]2. Here we allow participants to provide
opinions on both statements and the relationships between them. Opin-
ions about relationships capture participants’ acceptance, or otherwise,
of the reasoning that the relationship represents; and opinions about
statements reflect participants’ satisfaction with the statement itself.
Furthermore, we follow [37, 56] in allowing opinion about relationships
1We could relate the statements with axioms, premises or conclusions, and the rela-
tionships by the rules or demonstration steps that lead from premises to conclusions, just
as in structured argumentation.
2[37] is not about combining collective opinions on relationships between arguments,
but it provides the groundwork for such a system by studying argumentation where the
relationships between arguments have different weights.
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and statements to be expressed using real values rather than the dis-
crete values of [7, 46]. This feature allows the participants to express
their opinions in a wider range of values, making the approach more
flexible. (It should be noted though that most existing e-participation
systems just allow users to express agreement or disagreement.)
- A more flexible notion of coherence. Previous work on determining
collective opinions makes use of a notion of “rationality” in which an
opinion is either determined to be acceptable or not acceptable (where
“acceptable” has different interpretations but reflects the constraints
on distributions of opinions across statements) [7, 46, 75]. We think
that this is somewhat limiting. Since the opinions originate with hu-
man participants, and humans are not always consistent in their views,
we feel that insisting on this rigid form can lead to lose valuable in-
formation. Hence, we propose a less restrictive notion of rationality,
which we call “coherence”, to assess the degree to which an opinion is
coherent, be it from an agent or from the collective aggregation. To
take a simple example, an agent valuing with opposite values two re-
lated statements, one supporting the other, would be understood as
not coherent, while another agent valuing the same statements with
similar values would be classified as coherent. Note that we do not
compare different agents’ opinions in establishing coherence, but look
within the same opinion.
- Aggregation functions exploiting dependencies. We propose several opin-
ion aggregation functions that use the participant’s opinion on a debate
to compute a collective opinion. These proposed functions assume dif-
ferent forms of using the dependencies between opinions to combine
them. We provide two families of function that include a function that
does not use dependencies at all, and two other functions that use
dependencies rather differently. These families of functions collective
span the ways in which the dependencies can be taken account of, thus
making it possible to choose a specific degree of use of the dependencies.
- Formal analysis. We assess these families of functions against a wide-
ranging set of properties designed to provide a detailed characterization
of their behaviour. We use several properties adapted from the social
choice literature [58] to fit our model in order to assess the performance
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of the functions. We carry out the same study in four scenarios that
consider different assumptions for the participants’ opinions.
- Computational analysis. We follow the formal analysis with a compu-
tational analysis. This first computes the computational complexity
of the aggregation functions, and then provides an empirical analysis
of those functions when computing collective opinions for a range of
scenarios that are larger (in terms of statements and number of opin-
ions) than any online debates that we are aware of. This analysis shows
that collective opinions can be computed in real time on quite modest
hardware.
These contributions can be found in the following sections: section 2 pro-
vides an introduction to the relational model; and sections 3 and section 4
provide a formal definition of the model. Then, section 5 defines the problem
of computing collective coherence and introduces the properties that will be
used to assess aggregation functions, while section 6 defines a family of aggre-
gation functions and section 7 uses the properties to analyse the functions
in different scenarios (the proofs can be found in Appendix A). Section 8
provides the computational assessment of the model; section 9 relates the
work presented in this paper to other relevant work in the literature; and
section 10 summarises our conclusions.
2. Foundations of the relational model
This section introduces the main features of the relational model while
the following sections provide a formalisation of the model. We start this
section by describing the elements of the model and the rationale behind it,
as well as the aggregation of opinions using the information enclosed within
the model. We also include a discussion of how the model could be used in
a participatory system.
2.1. Relational Model
The Relational Model, RM for short, is a model designed to represent a
collective debate where participants discuss a proposal by putting forward
additional information relevant for the discussion and giving their opinions
about it. The RM is composed of two main parts: the structural part,
organising the information (or content) of a debate; and the interpretative
part, representing the participants’ opinions in a debate.
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Content of a debate. The RM has two main abstract elements that capture
the structure of a debate: statements and the relationships among them.
Statements represent plain sentences that describe facts such as, for example,
“Increase of house prices in the neighbourhood”. Participants will afterwards
be able to express their opinion about the desirability or undesirability of the
sentence. Relationships represent the reasoning that connects statements.
Each relationship connects a set of source statements to some destination
statement. We can think of relationships as logical inferences that may or
may not be accepted by the participants of the debate. Such acceptance will
also be included in participants’ opinions.
Commonly, debates discuss a particular subject or proposal, and may even
consider a set of proposals. In the RM we consider the target (of a debate) as
a set of statements that represents the proposal. The distinguishing feature
of these statements, the target of the debate, is that none of them can be a
destination statement in any relationship because they are the initiators of
the debate. Thus, the target acts as root of the structure that captures the
debate. This structure composed of the statements, relationships and target
is called a Directed Relational Framework, or DRF for short.
Participants’ opinions. The opinions of the participants are encoded in the
form of functions that assign values to the objects that make up the structure
of the debate. The valuation function assigns values to statements and the
acceptance function assigns values to the relationships. The opinion of a par-
ticipant is twofold in order to obtain the two types of subjectivity involved
in the debate. The first, relating to the valuation function, provides a partic-
ipant with a way to express their judgement about the facts or possibilities
that arise in the debate (but does not express their view about the truth
of the sentence). The second, relating to the acceptance function, allows a
participant to express the truth they see in each relationship that is included
in the debate. Thus, the desirability or undesirability that each participant
feels about each statement of the debate is represented by a positive or nega-
tive value assigned with the valuation function, and the conformity that each
agent relates to the connections between the statements is represented by an
acceptance value assigned by the acceptance function.
Example 2.1. Consider a debate about building a sports centre. Let’s
assume a scenario where a proposal τ “Construction of a sports centre in
particular location in the neighbour” is discussed. In this setting, we may
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consider the reasoning that “The construction of the sport centre will im-
ply the demolition of existing buildings that give historical relevance to the
neighbourhood” is represented by the relationship r1 that connects the target
τ to a new statement s1 “Destruction of the character of the neighbourhood”,
as depicted in Figure 1.
Given these elements, participants in the debate can express their opin-
ions by providing a value to both τ and s1 and by assigning a degree of
acceptance to the relationship r1. The values assigned to τ or s1 will repre-
sent how they feel about the respective statements and the degree given to r1
will indicate how much the participant believes in the truth of the reasoning
relating both statements. Thus, someone hoping for a new sports center in
the neighbour — hence valuing the target τ positively — may not want the
neighbourhood to be damaged — so valuing s1 negatively — but still believes
that the construction of the sport center indeed will imply the demolition of
the existing buildings that now are historically relevant (and hence would
create that damage) —thus accepting the reasoning represented by r1.
τ
s1
r1
Figure 1: Graphical representation of the relationship between proposal τ (building a
sports centre) and statement s1 (destroying the neighbourhood’s character)
When considering this example it is worth elaborating on the direction of
the relationship regarding content and opinion. Observe that relationship r1
is directed from τ towards statement s1 so that s1 can be interpreted as its
consequence. But, conversely, the opinion about s1 —be it either positive or
negative— will also affect the opinion on τ through relationship r1. Thus, the
opinion that a participant will have on a statement, in this case the target,
will be conditioned both by the consequences of this statement and by the
things from which it itself follows. In general, a direct relationship between
statements has to be established and we then decide which direction to take
when evaluating the framework. We may define this evaluation so as to relate
one statement s (or a set of statements) to (i) its consequence statements, or,
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to (ii) the statement whose opinion is affected by the opinion about s. We
choose the first (i) option to reflect the direction of reasoning (from premises
to conclusions) in the debate structure. However, our subsequent process
aimed at opinion aggregation will traverse these relationships in the opposite
(ii) direction, though we will use the same structure to represent the debate.
Direct and Indirect Opinion. Each participant involved in a debate expresses
its opinion in terms of the desirability or undesirability of the different state-
ments in the model, and the acceptability of the relationships linking these
statements. As mentioned above, relationships are a key element of the RM:
they indicate that the opinion about one statement affects the opinion about
another statement. In particular, we will use the terms: (i) direct opinion
to refer to the value directly given to a statement by a participant; and (ii)
indirect opinion to refer to the values given to the related objects whose opin-
ions may condition the direct opinion. Note that we are dealing with human
opinions, and so we cannot expect that opinions are rational — contradic-
tions or inconsistencies between the direct and indirect opinions expressed by
participants may arise, just as in the example shown above. By comparing
the direct opinion with the indirect opinion about each statement we can
categorise “reasonable” opinions and provide a notion of coherence [86].
Example 2.2. Now consider three people taking part in the debate described
above with the following opinions:
- Participant 1 is a middle-aged woman with a family who lives in the
neighbourhood where the sports centre is proposed to be built. She
values the proposal (τ) very positively, because her family practices
sports. Although she has been living in the neighbourhood for a long
time, she has no childhood memories of and doesn’t care too much for
the historical character of the neighbourhood, so she values statement
s1 as neutral. Finally, she assigns a small acceptance value to relation-
ship r1 because she acknowledges that building the sports centre will
imply the demolition of some buildings, but she doesn’t believe that
the character of the neighbour will be too affected by such a loss.
- Participant 2 is a retired elderly man. He has always lived in the
neighbourhood and he would like to preserve its unique features. Hence,
he values statement s1 negatively, and also target τ because he is not
interested in sports and would prefer another kind of public building
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instead. He fully agrees with relationship r1, since he considers that
the buildings in the proposed location for the new sports centre are
important to the neighbourhood and would be demolished if the centre
is built.
- Participant 3 is a young postgraduate student who does not practice
any regular sports that can be hold in the planed sports centre, so
values τ quite negatively. He agrees with relationship r1 because he ac-
knowledges that the existing buildings could be catalogued as of special
architectural interest. However, he is neutral with respect to s1 because
he does not care about preserving the character of the neighbourhood.
Opinion Aggregation. Once all users have expressed their opinions on state-
ments and relationships, opinions must be aggregated to calculate a collec-
tive opinion. This aggregation can take into account direct opinions, indirect
opinions, or a combination of both direct and indirect. In establishing suit-
able aggregation functions, we have to take into account that individual opin-
ions may be incoherent. Nonetheless, we aim to design aggregation functions
that can combine these “imperfect” individual opinions into a “reasonable”
collective opinion.
The main contribution of the RM is to distinguish clearly between objec-
tive and subjective information in a simplified way, and to do this differently
to many other argumentation models (as [7, 45, 56]), where subjective in-
formation is jointly represented with objective information in the debate
structure leading to predefined relationships (such as attack or defence) that
must be shared among all participants. Thus, the expressiveness of the RM
is significantly higher being able to represent debates where participants do
not need to agree on the relationships between different objective facts. In
addition, these argumentation models usually presume that users opinions
are rational (i.e., fully consistent). However, human debates are affected by
information and/or cognitive limitations of users, which makes this ratio-
nality requirement too restrictive. We argue that our coherence notion is a
weaker version of this rationality requirement that is better suited to model
human debates.
2.2. The collective decision workflow
A debate can be built in many ways following the parameters of a DRF.
Next we propose a simple procedure that would produce a DRF and will
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serve as a support guide for the sections to come. There are four main steps
to applying our model:
Step 1 - Start debate. A set of statements for which we intend to obtain a
collective opinion are chosen as targets of the RM.
Step 2 - Extend debate. Participants are then allowed to put forward re-
lationships that will represent relevant reasoning. A relationship may
either be put forward in conjunction with new statements –so it con-
nects from existing statements to a new statement– or it may connect
existing statements. This step continues until no participant wishes to
add a further relationship.
Step 3 - Input opinions. Participants express their opinions on all the
relationships and statements in the RM, by providing subjective eval-
uations of them. The evaluations of statements expresses preferences
over them, while the evaluation of relationships expresses agreement,
or otherwise, with the reasoning represented by the relationship.
Step 4 - Obtain collective opinion. The opinions of the participants are
merged to establish a consensus view of each statement and relationship
that are in the framework. Hence we also obtain the collective opinion
of the target statements.
These steps are shown graphically in Figure 2.
3. Formalising the relational model
Recall from section 2 that we conceptually distinguished between the
structural part of the relational model , namely the statements made during a
debate together with their causal relationships, and the opinions put forward
by participants in a debate. Figure 3 depicts this distinction, together with
all the basic elements presented in this section. Thus, in what follows, we
formally introduce both concepts, first the structure and then the opinions,
with the aid of an extension of the example shown in section 2 that we employ
throughout the paper.
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Figure 2: Participation using the relational model: debate steps graphically explained.
12
Figure 3: The basic elements of our relational model.
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3.1. Formalising the structure
First, we introduce the formal notion of a relational framework to capture
the relationships between statements. Our notion of relationship will consider
a non-empty set of source statements and a destination statement. In gen-
eral, by relating a set of (source) statements to a (destination) statement, we
indicate that the source statements support inferring the destination state-
ment, though the framework is agnostic about the form that the support
and the inference mechanism takes. For instance, in our example in Figure
4, statements s2 and s3 support inferring s4. Formally:
Definition 3.1. A relational framework RF is a pair 〈S,R〉, where S is a
set of statements and R ⊂ P(S)× S × N is a relation fulfilling:
• Acyclicity. There are no cycles in R, namely there is no subset of
relationships {(Σ0, s1, c1), . . . , (Σn−1, sn, cn)} ⊂ R such that si ∈ Σi,
i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}, and sn ∈ Σ0.
Since the relation R is acyclic, it follows that R is neither reflexive ( ∀s ∈
S, (Σ ∪ {s}, s, c) /∈ R) nor symmetric (∀s1, s2 ∈ S, if (Σ1 ∪ {s1}, s2, c2) ∈ R
then (Σ2 ∪ {s2}, s1, c1) /∈ R). Note that we do not impose any restriction on
the transitivity of the relation R.
Notice also that we include a natural number within the relation in order
to differentiate relationships between the same set of statements Σ and s.
From a practical perspective, this allows to signal that alternative relation-
ships can bear on the very same statements3 (as shown in Figure 4, where
target τ is related to statement s1 through relationships r1 and r6).
Now, since debates are aimed at achieving a collective decision on target
topics, we extend our definition above to incorporate the notion of target
statements as follows:
Definition 3.2. A directed relational framework (DRF) is a tuple 〈S,R, T 〉
such that:
(i) 〈S,R〉 is a relational framework;
3The inclusion of a natural number into the specification of a relationship does not
affect the formal contributions of the paper, since, as it will be shown later, relationships
are grouped into (and subsequently traversed through) the sets R+ defined in equation 1,
without considering any restrictions on the statements they relate.
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(ii) T ⊂ S is a set of target statements;
(iii) Target statements in T can only be the source of relationships, namely
for any relationship (Σ, s, c) ∈ R, s /∈ T ; and
(iv) All non-target statements are connected to targets so that for any state-
ment s ∈ S, s /∈ T , there is a path {(Σ0, s1, c1), . . . , (Σn−1, s, cn)} ⊂ R
such that T ∩ Σ0 6= ∅.
(v) Every target statement shares some common descendant with some
other target statement, namely for every τ ∈ T there is another target
τ ′ ∈ T and some statement s ∈ S such that there is a path from τ to s
and another path from τ ′ to s.
Note that a DRF is constrained to be a connected acyclic graph, albeit
one that can have several targets. This reflects the idea that, since a DRF
represents a single debate, every statement in that debate should have some
connection to the rest of the debate.
In what follows we extend our example in section 2 to produce a graphi-
cal representation of a DRF that will help us visualise the information in a
debate4. In this representation, statements are nodes and relationships are
arcs. Recall that our example considered statements τ (Construct a new
sports centre in a specific place in the neighbour) and s1 (Destruction of
the neighbour character), as well as relationship r1 (The construction of the
sport centre will imply the demolition of existing buildings that give histor-
ical relevance to the neighbourhood) connecting both. Besides that, next
we consider further statements and relationships as listed in tables 1 and
2 respectively. Finally, figure 4 depicts the connections between statements
through relationships. Note that r4 is a hyperedge, connecting three state-
ments5.
4For the sake of simplicity, we limit the example to three participants and a small
number of statements and relationships.
5Notice that one participant could introduce an extra relationships from τ to s5, rep-
resenting the reasoning “A new community center will give more relevance to the neigh-
bourhood, that will increase the house price”, which is not the sum of r2, r3 and r4, but
represents a whole new way to connect τ to s5. This shows that the transitivity allowed
in the model, connecting statements from not consecutive levels of the debate via a single
relationship, is not intended to represent the combined reasoning formed by the reasoning
steps in between.
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Statement Description
τ Construction of a sport centre in a particular location in the neighbour
s1 Destruction of the neighbour character
s2 Attraction of more affluent residents to the neighbour
s3 Attraction of new business to the neighbour
s4 Crime reduction in the neighbour
s5 Property values raise in the neighbour
Table 1: Statements for the sports centre example.
τ
s1 s2 s3
s4s5
r1
r2
r3
r4
r5
r6
Figure 4: The DRF for the sports centre example.
3.2. Formalising opinions
Now we address the formalisation of the opinions put forward by par-
ticipants in a debate. We consider that opinions can be held both about
statements and relationships. We therefore define two functions that cap-
ture the opinions of individuals: (i) a valuation function over statements;
and (ii) an acceptance function over relationships. On the one hand, a valu-
ation function conveys the subjective value that an individual places on each
statement. On the other hand, an acceptance function expresses the subjec-
tive plausibility that an individual assigns to each relationship, representing
a reasoning, connecting statements. Formally:
Definition 3.3 (Valuation function). Given a DRF 〈S,R, T 〉, a valuation
function v : S −→ I maps each statement to a value in I = [−a, a], a ∈ R+.
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Relationship Reasoning Connection
r1 The construction of the sport centre will imply the τ to s1
demolition of existing buildings which now give
historical relevance to the neighbour
r2 The new sport centre will make the neighbour more τ to s2
attractive for wealthy residents because
they are more interested in leisure activities
r3 A new community centre will attract more τ to s3
businesses to the surrounding area.
r4 Having richer residents and more businesses will {s2, s3} to s4
increase the security measures around the neighbour
and therefore reduce criminal activities.
r5 The reduction of crime will increase the price of s4 to s5
the houses in the neighbour
r6 A new building will make collide the new τ to s1
architecture with the extended old nature of
the area, changing its character
Table 2: Reasoning for the sports centre example.
Given a statement s ∈ S: if v(s) = a we say that s counts on full positive
valuation; if v(s) = −a we say that s counts on full negative valuation; and
if v(s) = 0 we say that s has neutral valuation.
Definition 3.4 (Acceptance function). Given a DRF 〈S,R, T 〉, an accep-
tance function maps each relationship to a value in I+, w : R −→ I+ = [0, a].
Given a relationship r ∈ R and an acceptance function w, we will refer
to the value w(r) as the acceptance degree of r. If w(r) = a we say that the
acceptance function expresses full agreement with the relationship, whereas
if w(r) = 0 we say that it expresses full disagreement. Without loss of
generality, henceforth we will set a to 1, and hence I = [−1, 1] and I+ = [0, 1].
Considering our running example, graphically represented in figure 4, fig-
ures 5 and 6 show the valuation functions and acceptance functions of agents
1, 2, and 3: v1, v2 and v3 encode agents’ valuations on statements, while w1,
w2 and w3 encode agents’ acceptances of relationships. We consider now the
description of agents’ opinions in section 2.1 to exemplify how they translate
into valuations and acceptances. Thus, for instance, agent one is “highly
positive” on the target τ (v1(τ) = 0.9), but neutral regarding statement
s1 (v1(s1) = 0). Furthermore, agent one considers that the plausibility of
relationship r1 is “little” (w1(r1) = 0.2).
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τs1 s2 s3
s4s5
v1(τ) = 0.9
v2(τ) =−0.5
v3(τ) =−0.5
v1(s1) = 0
v2(s1) =−1
v3(s1) = 0 v1(s2) = 0.7
v2(s2) = 1
v3(s2) =−0.8
v1(s3) = 1
v2(s3) = 0.5
v3(s3) = 0.5
v1(s4) = 1
v2(s4) = 1
v3(s4) = 1
v1(s5) =−1
v2(s5) = 1
v3(s5) =−1
Figure 5: Agents’ valuation functions.
τ
s1 s2 s3
s4s5
w1(r1) = 0.2
w2(r1) = 1
w3(r1) = 0.6
w1(r2) = 0.1
w2(r2) = 0.7
w3(r2) = 1
w1(r3) = 1
w2(r3) = 0.8
w3(r3) = 1
w1(r4) = 1
w2(r4) = 1
w3(r4) = 0.3
w1(r5) = 1
w2(r5) = 0.5
w3(r5) = 1
w1(r6) = 0.5
w2(r6) = 1
w3(r6) = 0.2
Figure 6: Agents’ acceptance functions.
At this point, we are ready to formally introduce the notion of individual
opinion over a DRF .
Definition 3.5 (Opinion). Given a DRF = 〈S,R, T 〉, an opinion over the
DRF is a pair O = (v, w) such that v is a valuation function and w is an
acceptance degree.
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For practical and realistic purposes, we assume that for each relationship
at least one agent values it different from 0. Otherwise, it would be the same,
in practical terms, to have or not have the relationship in the debate.
Henceforth, we shall note the class of all opinions over aDRF asO(DRF ).
As depicted in figures 5 and 6, each agent i involved in a debate will have
its individual opinion Oi = (vi, wi). Our goal will be to compute a collective
opinion from the opinions issued by the agents.
4. Characterising coherent opinions
Previous work on the formal modelling of debates has placed restrictions
on the opinions that individuals can put forward. For example, [7] interprets
the opinions expressed by individuals as labels, in the sense of [11], for the
arguments that they are expressing opinions about. Thus, an argument can
be labelled in, meaning that the individual thinks that it holds, out, meaning
that the individual thinks it does not hold, or undec, meaning that the
individual is not sure whether it holds or not. These labellings are restricted
to be complete labellings [11], broadly meaning that they conform to a notion
of rationality where arguments are out if they are attacked by arguments
that have been established to be in, and are in if they are only attacked
by arguments that are out. We believe that the restrictions imposed by
these notions are too restrictive for modelling human debates, as humans
may express opinions that are far from rational.
Instead, we impose weaker conditions for an individual opinion to be clas-
sified as reasonable or coherent, along the lines of our former work in [46].
Hence, given a statement we contrast opinions expressed about that state-
ment, the direct opinion, with the opinions expressed about the immediate
descendants of the statement, what we call the indirect opinion, and look for
ways in which these may be made somewhat consistent.
Informally, what we do is the following. First, we compute an estimated
opinion for a statement based on the indirect opinion about it. Then we say
that a set of opinions about a statement are coherent if the estimated opinion
for the statement aligns with the direct opinion about the statement. This
will be the case when the opinion (valuations) about the descendants is close
to the overall opinion (valuation) about the statement. Considering our ex-
ample in figure 5 again, consider statement τ , its descendants (s1, s2, and s3),
and the opinion of agent 2 (v2). We observe that although the direct opinion
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about τ is rather negative (v2(τ) = −0.5), the valuations for its descendants
are diverse: while the valuation for s1 is also rather negative (v2(s1) = −1),
and hence in line with τ , the valuations on the other descendants are rather
positive (v2(s2) = 1 and v2(s3) = 0.5), and hence not in line with τ . Thus,
at first sight6 it would seem that the overall estimated opinion is not in line
with the direct opinion.
In what follows, we first formalise our notion of estimation as an aggre-
gated measure formed from the indirect opinion about a statement — i.e.,
the collection of values on the descendants and their relationships. This
will consider valuations and acceptance degrees related to a statement and
its relationships so that the more accepted a relation between a statement
and its descendants, the more important the opinion about that descendant.
Thereafter, we will formalise our notion of coherence by measuring how close
the direct opinion about a statement is to the estimated opinion about that
statement.
First, we introduce some concepts and notations that will aid us on later
steps. Given a DRF = 〈S,R, T 〉, we define the set of relationships from
s ∈ S as the set of relationships having s in the set of initial statements.
Formally,
R+(s) = {r = (Σ, s′, c) ∈ R | s ∈ Σ}. (1)
We will use the term descendants of a statement s, denoted by D(s), to refer
to any statement sr connected to s by a relationship r that has s as one of
the initial statements and sr as final statement. Formally,
D(s) = {sr ∈ S | r = (Σ, sr, c) ∈ R+(s)}.
Next, we define the concept that connects direct and indirect opinion in order
to characterise our notion of coherence. We will use an estimation function
to compute an estimate of the direct opinion using the values gathered for
the indirect opinion.
Definition 4.1. Given a DRF = 〈S,R, T 〉 and O = (v, w) and opinion over
the DRF , the estimation function is a valuation function:
e : S −→ I
s 7−→ e(s) = f(IO(s))
6Note that we are not considering acceptances at this point.
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where IO(s) = {(v(sr), w(r)) | r ∈ R(s), sr ∈ D(s)} and f is a projection:
f : IO(s) −→ I
that computes an approximate value for s from the valuations and accep-
tance degrees in the indirect opinion.
e : S
IO(s)
I
Figure 7: A visualization of the estimation function.
In other words, the estimation function computes an estimated value for
a statement using the valuations and acceptance degrees for indirect opinion
about that statement. Figure 7 is a diagrammatic representation of the
estimation function. This definition is designed to be an abstract definition
that allows for many estimation functions to be defined to compute different
approximations for the direct opinion. It therefore specifies a broad family
of estimation functions rather than any specific function.
For the rest of this paper we will use a specific estimation function to com-
pute the estimate opinion on the results later on. We will use the weighted
average of the valuations on the descendants, where the weights are the ac-
ceptance degrees on the relations leading to each descendant. In this manner,
the more accepted a relation, the more valued the opinion on the descendant.
Formally,
e(s) =

v(s) if R+(s) = ∅ or ∑r∈R+(s)w(r) = 0,
∑
r∈R+(s) w(r)v(sr)∑
r∈R+(s) w(r)
otherwise.
Notice that when a statement has no descendants we take the direct op-
tion as the estimated opinion, thus we cannot gather any value from an empty
indirect opinion. Notice also that this specification of estimated opinion can
be regarded as a general approach to compute the direct opinion using the
indirect opinion. This is because we are allowing the relationships between
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statements to represent any kind of reasoning, so we cannot specify a specific
behaviour for the estimated value.
Informally, an opinion is characterised as coherent for a given statement
when the value assigned by the participant (issuing the opinion) to the state-
ment (i.e., its direct opinion) is aligned with the values and plausibility as-
signed to its descendants (i.e., its estimate opinion). Furthermore, given
the continuous values allowed on the opinion, we can choose the degree of
coherence by using a parameter . Formally:
Definition 4.2 (Coherence). Consider a DRF = 〈S,R, T 〉 and an  ∈ (0, 1)7
difference. We say that opinion O = (v, w) is -coherent on s ∈ S when
|v(s)− e(s)| < .
In general, an opinion O will be -coherent if it is -coherent for every
statement in S. We will notate as C(DRF ) the class of all the -coherent
opinions. Thus, if O is an -coherent opinion then O ∈ C(DRF ).
Example 4.1. Following the example, now we can compare the values from
the expectation function and the actual value given by participant 1 to each
statement, its direct opinion, see figure 8. We can see that if  ∈ (0.3, 1) then
the opinion of participant 1 for the statements s1, s2, s3 and s5 is -coherent
but not for statement s4 due to the difference between direct opinion and
estimated value, which is the maximum possible. Because of this statement
s4, the opinion of participant 1 cannot be classified as -coherent for any
 ∈ (0, 1).
7We choose the interval (0,1) for the value of  as the minimum interval that guarantees
that if the direct opinion is 1 (or -1) then an opinion cannot be classified as coherent when
the estimation function value is of the opposite sign, i.e., e(s) 6≤ 0 (or e(s) 6≥ 0 respectively)
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τs1 s2 s3
s4s5
v1(τ)− e1(τ) = 0.3
v1(s1)− e1(s1) = 0 v1(s2)− e1(s2) = −0.3 v1(s3)− e1(s3) = 0
v1(s4)− e1(s4) = 2v1(s5)− e1(s5) = 0
Figure 8: Coherence of Agent 1
5. Formalising the collective decision making problem
As stated above, our goal is to help agents reach a collective decision on
target statements. This corresponds to step 4 of the protocol in Section 2.2
and Figure 2 (as well as to the third stage in Figure 3). In Section 5.1 we
cast our goal as an opinion aggregation problem. We propose to solve such
problem using an aggregation function that synthesises a single opinion out of
all agents’ opinions. Although opinions can be aggregated in different ways,
here we follow [46] in requiring that the outcome of an aggregation must be
fair. In particular, Section 5.2 introduces desirable social choice properties
to help analyse and compare opinion aggregation functions.
5.1. The opinion aggregation problem
First, we define our notion of an opinion profile, which brings together
the opinions of the individuals involved in a debate. From hereon we use the
term “agent” along with the term “individual” to refer to the participants in
the debate.
Definition 5.1 (Opinion profile). Let Ag = {1, . . . , n} be a set of n agents
and a DRF = 〈S,R, T 〉. An opinion profile is a collection of opinions (O1 =
(v1, w1), . . . , On = (vn, wn)) ∈ O(DRF )n over the DRF such that Oi =
(vi, wi) stands for the opinion of agent i.
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The problem at hand is how to aggregate the opinions in an opinion profile
to produce a single opinion so that single opinion is a reasonable summary of
the opinions in the opinion profile. If the opinion profile represents the views
expressed by individuals in a debate, the combination should represent the
collective opinion of all the individuals. The opinion aggregation function,
which we formalise below, is the mechanism for establishing this collective
opinion.
Definition 5.2 (Opinion aggregation function). Given a DRF and a set of n
agents Ag, a function F : D ⊂ O(DRF )n −→ O(DRF ) mapping an opinion
profile to a single opinion is called an opinion aggregation function. Given
an opinion profile P in the domain D, F (P ) is called the collective opinion
by F and it will be noted as F (P ) = (vF (P ), wF (P )).
Thus, in terms of the components of our model, the collective opinion
output by an opinion aggregation function combines the collective valuations
over statements and the collective acceptances over the relationships linking
them. In section 6 we define specific opinion aggregation functions that
compute a collective opinion. Before that we introduce the properties that
we will use to analyse the aggregation functions.
5.2. Social choice properties
Social choice theory provides formal properties to characterise aggregation
methods in terms of outcome fairness [32]. In what follows, we formally adapt
some of the desirable social properties of an aggregation function introduced
in [7] and [46]. Besides adapting properties, we define some novel properties
that characterise aggregation functions motivated by the fact that here we
are considering opinions to be continuous-valued in contrast to the discrete-
valued opinions considered in [7] and [46].
First, we characterise aggregation functions in terms of the opinion pro-
files that they can take as input. Thus, we adapt from [7] the notion of
exhaustive domain to characterise opinion aggregation functions that are de-
fined for any opinion profile. Thereafter, we modify this property to limit an
opinion aggregation function to operate with -coherent opinion profiles.
Exhaustive Domain (ED) . An opinion aggregation function F satis-
fies exhaustive domain if its domain is D = O(DRF )n, namely if the
function can operate over all profiles.
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-Coherent Domain (-CD). An opinion aggregation function F satis-
fies -coherent domain if its domain D contains all -coherent opinion
profiles, namely C(DRF )n ⊆ D.
Note that we will sometimes refer to -Coherent Domain as “coherent do-
main”.
Lemma 5.1. An opinion aggregation function satisfying exhaustive domain
also satisfies -coherent domain.
Proof. Straightforward, since an aggregation function taking any opinion pro-
file will also take -coherent opinion profiles.
Moreover, we also define collective -coherence as a property characteris-
ing opinion aggregation functions that produce -coherent collective opinions.
Therefore, our notion of collective -coherence here is more relaxed than the
crisp notion of coherence in [46].
Collective -coherence (-CC). An opinion aggregation function F sat-
isfies -collective coherence if for all P ∈ D, then F (P ) ∈ C(DRF ).
In accordance with [46], here we consider -CC as the most desirable property
that can be satisfied by an aggregation function, since collective coherence
is the foundation of the acceptability of collective decisions [86]. Notice also
that, as in [46], collective coherence can be regarded as the counterpart of
the notion of collective rationality in [7].
Next, anonymity and non-dictatorship characterise the importance of the
agents involved in a debate that yields a collective opinion. On the one hand,
anonymity is a social choice property requiring that the opinions of all the
agents involved in a debate are considered to be equally significant. On the
other hand, non-dictatorship requires that no agent overrules the opinions of
the rest of agents.
Anonymity (A) Let P = (O1, . . . , On) be an opinion profile in D, σ a
permutation over Ag, and P ′ = (Oσ(1), . . . , Oσ(n)) the opinion profile
resulting from applying σ over P . An opinion aggregation function F
satisfies anonymity if F (P ) = F (P ′).
Non-Dictatorship (ND). An opinion aggregation function F satisfies
non-dictatorship if no agent i ∈ Ag satisfies that F (P ) = Oi for every
opinion profile P ∈ D.
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Notice that non-dictatorship is a weaker version of anonymity since it follows
directly from it — any aggregation function that satisfies anonymity will
satisfy non-dictatorship.
Now we consider how an opinion aggregation function behaves when
agents agree on their opinions about statements. Unanimity is the social
choice property that characterises the behaviour of aggregation functions
when there is agreement among agents’ opinions. Here we will adapt the
classic notion of unanimity in [7], here called narrow unanimity, and the
notion of endorsed unanimity from [46] that helps exploit dependencies be-
tween statements. Since the notion of narrow unanimity is rather rigid, we
also define two new, more flexible unanimity properties. Therefore, overall we
define a family of unanimity properties, and below we study the relationships
between them.
Narrow Unanimity (NU). Let P = (O1, . . . , On) be an opinion profile,
where P ∈ D. An opinion aggregation profile F satisfies narrow una-
nimity if, for any s ∈ S such that vi(s) = λ for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, then
vF (P )(s) = λ holds.
Narrow unanimity defines unanimity as being when all agents share the very
same opinion. While this is very possible in settings where agents only have
a few discrete possibilities for expressing their opinion, as in [7, 46], it is
not likely to occur in the setting we are studying here, where opinions can
take a wide range of values. As a result, we propose some relaxed variations
which are more useful for the setting we consider. First, we say that sided
unanimity will hold when, for each statement, either all opinions on it are
positive or negative. Formally,
Sided Unanimity (SU). Let P = (O1, . . . , On) be an opinion profile,
where P ∈ D. An opinion aggregation profile F satisfies sided-unanimity
if for every s ∈ S:
• if vi(s) > 0 for all i ∈ Ag then vF (P )(s) > 0;
• if vi(s) < 0 for all i ∈ Ag then vF (P )(s) < 0.
We also find a weaker version of sided unanimity to be worth distinguishing:
Weak Unanimity (WU). Let P = (O1, . . . , On) be an opinion profile,
where P ∈ D. An aggregation profile F satisfies Weak unanimity if,
for every s ∈ S:
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• if vi(s) = 1 for all i ∈ Ag then vF (P )(s) > 0;
• if vi(s) = −1 for all i ∈ Ag then vF (P )(s) < 0.
Although WU requires that all agents agree on fully positive (1) or fully
negative (-1) valuations on statements, it does not require that the output
of the opinion aggregation function takes on those same values, as required
by narrow unanimity. This property has value when translating valuations
expressed in a discrete model such as those in [7, 46] into our model, and so
has value in allowing us to relate our model to those which came before.
From the definitions above, it follows that the three notions of unanimity
are related.
Proposition 5.1 (Unanimity relationships). If an opinion aggregation func-
tion satisfies Sided Unanimity then it satisfies Weak Unanimity. If an opinion
aggregation function satisfies Narrow Unanimity then it satisfies Weak Una-
nimity.
Proof. Clearly, if an aggregation function cannot hold the sign of the ag-
gregation when the assumptions of Weak Unanimity are satisfied, then it is
straightforward to see that will fail to satisfy Sided Unanimity.
Obviously, if an aggregation function returns a value λ when all the agents
valued the statement as λ, it will return the value when it is 1 or −1.
Below, we will show that we need further assumptions to prove that NU
implies SU.
As a final unanimity property, we adapt the notion of endorsed unanim-
ity from [46] to consider unanimity based on indirect opinions. In short,
an opinion aggregation function will satisfy endorsed unanimity if, for each
statement, the collective opinion on the statement is in line with the unani-
mous indirect opinion on it. Formally,
Endorsed Unanimity (EU). Let P = (O1, . . . , On) be an opinion profile
such that P ∈ D. An aggregation profile F satisfies endorsed unanimity
if for every s ∈ S:
(i) if vi(sd) = 1 for any i ∈ Ag and sd ∈ D(s) (called full positive
support), then vF (P )(s) > 0; and
(ii) if vi(sd) = −1 for any i ∈ Ag and sd ∈ D(s) (called full negative
support), then vF (P )(s) < 0.
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Note that, this property is closely related to the notion of coherence. We will
show below that restricting the domain to coherent opinion profiles will help
to fulfil coherence.
Next, we introduce monotonicity properties to study how the result of
an opinion aggregation function changes as opinions change. First, we adapt
the notion of monotonicity from [7]: if some of the direct opinions about a
statement increase (or decrease) the collective opinion should increase (or
decrease) accordingly.
Monotonicity (M) Let s ∈ S be a statement, and P = (O1, . . . , On) and
P ′ = (O′1, . . . , O
′
n) such that for every i vi(s) ≤ v′i(s). We say that an
opinion aggregation function F is monotonic if vF (P )(s) ≤ vF (P ′)(s).
Notice that M only takes into account the direct opinion about each state-
ment. Since we aim at handling opinion aggregation functions that merge
both direct and indirect opinions, we define a variation of monotoniciy taking
this into account. To do this we adapt the notion of familiar monotonicity8 in
[46]. In our case, familiar monotonicity requires that when the direct opinion
on a statement increases, the collective opinion does not decrease provided
that the opinions on the descendants of the statement do not change either.
Formally:
Familiar Monotonicity (FM). Let s ∈ S be a statement, and P =
(O1, . . . , On) and P
′ = (O′1, . . . , O
′
n) such that for every opinion i satis-
fies that vi(s) ≤ v′i(s), and, wi(r) = w′i(r) and vi(sr) = v′i(sr) for every
relationship r ∈ R(s) and its associated descendant sr ∈ D(s). We
say that an opinion aggregation function F satisfies FM if vF (P )(s) ≤
vF (P ′)(s).
The following lemma establishes the relationship between monotonicity prop-
erties.
Lemma 5.2. An opinion aggregation function that satisfies monotonicity
also satisfies familiar monotonicity.
Proof. Since FM assumes a restriction on the descendants’ opinions that
monotonicity does not, clearly fulfilling monotonicity implies the fulfilment
of familiar monotonicity.
8The name derives from the fact that this form of monotonicity takes into account
opinion about the descendents of a statement which make up its family.
28
Now we are ready to prove the relationship between narrow unanimity
and sided unanimity via monotonicity.
Proposition 5.2. An opinion aggregation function that satisfies Narrow
unanimity and Monotonicity also satisfies Sided unanimity.
Proof. Let F be an opinion aggregation function that fulfils Narrow una-
nimity and Monotonicity. Let P = (O1, . . . , On) be an opinion profile over
a DRF and s ∈ S. Assume that for any i ∈ Ag, vi(s) ≥ λ for a certain
λ > 0. Consider the opinion profile P ′ such that for any i v′i(s) = λ. Then,
by Monotonicity of F , vF (P )(s) ≥ vF (P ′)(s) holds, and by Narrow unanimity
of F , vF (P ′)(s) = λ. Then vF (P )(s) ≥ λ > 0, proving that also satisfies Sided
Unanimity. The proof for the negative case is analogous.
Finally, we introduce the property of independence, which will be used
to emphasise the difference between those opinion aggregation functions that
exploit direct and indirect opinions and the ones that do not. Essentially, the
property states that the collective opinion on a statement will only depend
on the direct opinions on it. Therefore, independence disregards indirect
opinions.
Independence (I) Let be two profiles P = (O1, . . . , On) and P
′ = (O′1, . . . , O
′
n),
such that P, P ′ ∈ D ; and s ∈ S a statement, such that for all agents
i ∈ {1, . . . , n} vi(s) = v′i(s). An aggregation function F satisfies inde-
pendence if vF (P )(s) = vF (P ′)(s).
Next result shows the relationship between monotonicity and independence.
Proposition 5.3. An opinion aggregation function that satisfies monotonic-
ity also satisfies independence.
Proof. Let s ∈ S be a statement and P = (O1, . . . , On), P ′ = (O′1, . . . , O′n)
two opinion profiles satisfying the assumptions of independence on s, i.e.,
for every i ∈ Ag vi(s) = v′i(s), and F an aggregation function satisfying
monotonicity.
For each i, the equality vi(s) = v
′
i(s) is equivalent to (a): vi(s) ≥ v′i(s),
and, (b): vi(s) ≤ v′i(s). Thus, assuming monotonicity from (a) we can deduce
vF (P )(s) ≥ vF (P ′)(s), and from (b) we can deduce that vF (P )(s) ≤ vF (P ′)(s).
Hence, we conclude that vF (P )(s) = vF (P ′)(s) proving that F satisfies inde-
pendence.
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Having listed these properties, it is important to note that they are not
all equal. For a multi-party discussion, we believe that the most important
property is collective coherence. If an aggregation function is collectively
coherent, the resulting combined opinion will be coherent regardless of the
coherence of the initial opinions that are being merged. In other words, an
aggregation function that satisfies collective coherence will always discover a
coherent overall opinion no matter how incoherent are the opinions on which
it is based. Along with collective coherence, the properties that we would
like to see for an aggregation function are the two domain related properties
— exhaustive domain and coherent domain — because they allow for broad
applicability of the function, and naturally we would prefer exhaustive do-
main because of its wider reach. Finally, we regard the usual social choice
properties of anonymity and non-dictatorship as essential.
Among the unanimity properties, we find sided, weak and endorsed una-
nimity, which allow more maneuverability when using dependencies to build
the collective opinion than narrow unanimity, to be more desirable than nar-
row unanimity. We do not consider narrow unanimity to be desirable because
of its close relationship to independence9. Thus, an aggregation function sat-
isfying narrow unanimity would forbid the use of the indirect opinion the way
we consider to be necessary.
Though it is natural to require some form of monotonicity, we do not
consider the property M to be desirable because of its relationship to inde-
pendence and the discarding of indirect opinion. Thus, in its place we prefer
familiar monotonicity, which takes into consideration indirect opinion.
Finally, although we focus the design of aggregation functions towards
the use of both direct and indirect opinion, we include independence, mono-
tonicity and narrow unanimity in the set of properties we consider in order to
to emphasize whether aggregation functions take account of indirect opinion
or not.
6. Aggregation functions to enact collective decision making
This section defines a family of aggregation functions for the relational
model. All of the aggregation functions that we define use some combination
of direct and indirect opinions to generate a collective opinion. Our aim is
9Though it is not directly related — we need to add further minor assumptions to
narrow unanimity for it to imply independence.
30
to explore the spectrum of aggregation functions from functions that only
employ direct opinions to functions that only employ indirect opinions, so
that we can later on (in section 7) compare the benefits that they yield in
terms of social choice properties. This will allow us to learn how to best
exploit indirect opinions to obtain collective opinions.
We start by defining an aggregation function that only aggregates direct
opinions, and thus disregards indirect opinions. This function will obtain
a collective opinion by averaging valuations per statement and acceptance
degrees per relation from the individual opinions in an opinion profile. For-
mally:
Definition 6.1 (Direct aggregation). Let 〈S,R, T 〉 be a DRF and P =
(O1, . . . , On) an opinion profile over the DRF . The direct aggregation of
P over the DRF is defined as a function D(P ) = (vD(P ), wD(P )), where
vD(P )(s) =
1
n
∑n
i=1 vi(s) and wD(P )(r) =
1
n
∑n
i=1wi(r) for any statement s ∈
S and relationship r ∈ R.
Example 6.1. Figure 9 shows the result of applying the direct function to
the opinion profile of our running example, shown in figures 5 and 6.
τ
s1 s2 s3
s4s5
vD(P )(τ) = −0.033
vD(P )(s1) = −0.33 vD(P )(s2) = 0.3 vD(P )(s3) = 0.66
vD(P )(s4) = 1.0vD(P )(s5) = −0.33
wD(P )(r1) = 0.6
wD(P )(r2) = 0.6
wD(P )(r3) = 0.93
wD(P )(r4) = 0.76
wD(P )(r5) = 0.83
wD(P )(r6) = 0.56
Figure 9: Direct function: aggregated valuations
Next, we define an aggregation function that only aggregates indirect
opinions, and disregards direct opinions. It is thus the converse of the direct
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aggregation function defined above. The aggregation of indirect opinions is
based on the aggregation of the estimation functions introduced in section 4.
Formally:
Definition 6.2 (Indirect aggregation). 〈S,R, T 〉 be a DRF and P = (O1, . . .
, On) an opinion profile over the DRF . The indirect aggregation of P over
the DRF is defined as a function I(P ) = (vI(P ), wI(P )), where vI(P )(s) =
1
n
∑n
i=1 ei(s), where ei is an estimation function, and wI(P )(r) =
1
n
∑n
i=1wi(r)
for any statement s ∈ S and relationship r ∈ R.
Notice that, while the direct aggregation function computes the average
of individuals’ direct opinions, the indirect aggregation function computes
the average of individuals’ indirect opinions. This is achieved by aggregating
individuals’ estimated opinions using an estimation function. We observe also
that both functions calculate in the same way the aggregation of acceptance
degrees. This will be the case for all the aggregation functions defined in
this section, and hence the difference between them will be the way in which
they aggregate valuations.
Example 6.2. Figure 10 shows the aggregated (collective) valuations ob-
tained by the indirect aggregation function for the opinion profile of our
running example shown in figure 5. For the sake of illustrating the com-
putation, notice that vI(τ) = (e1(τ) + e2(τ) + e3(τ))/3 = 0.079 where
e1(τ) = (0.2 · 0 + 0.5 · 0 + 0.1 · 0.7 + 1 · 1)/1.8 = 0.59, e2(τ) = −0.257,
and e3(τ) = −0.107. The aggregated acceptance degrees are the same as in
figure 9.
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τs1 s2 s3
s4s5
vI(P )(τ) = 0.076
vI(P )(s1) = −0.333 vI(P )(s2) = 1.0 vI(P )(s3) = 1.0
vI(P )(s4) = −0.333vI(P )(s5) = −0.333
Figure 10: Indirect function: aggregated valuations
Having defined two extremes of our spectrum of functions, we introduce
a family of aggregation functions based on a linear combination of the direct
and indirect aggregation functions.
Definition 6.3 (α-Balanced aggregation). Let 〈S,R, T 〉 be a DRF and P =
(O1, . . . , On) an opinion profile over the DRF . Given the direct aggregation
D(P ) = (vD(P ), wD(P )), the indirect aggregation I(P ) = (vI(P ), wI(P )), and
α ∈ [0, 1], we define the aggregation function Bα(P ) = (vBα(P ), wBα(P )),
where:
vBα(P ) = α · vD(P ) + (1− α) · vI(P )
wBα(P )(r) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
wi(r)
for any statement s ∈ S and relationship r ∈ R. We say that Bα is an
α-balanced aggregation function.
By changing the value of α we set the importance of the direct opinion
with respect to the indirect opinion. The functions resulting from definition
6.3 form a family of balanced aggregation functions: {Bα}α∈[0,1]. In partic-
ular, by setting α to 0 we obtain the indirect aggregation function, and by
setting it to 1 we obtain the direct aggregation function.
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Next, we define an aggregation function that exploits indirect opinions
differently. For a given statement, the so-called recursive aggregation function
calculates its aggregated valuation by using the collective opinion on its de-
scendants, which in turn is recursively computed from their descendants, and
so on. This recursive computing ends up when reaching statements without
descendants whose indirect opinion is empty. Therefore, the recursive aggre-
gation, unlike balanced aggregations, disregards individual valuations in the
indirect opinion, and employs their collective opinions instead.
Definition 6.4 (Recursive aggregation). Let 〈S,R, T 〉 be a DRF and P =
(O1, . . . , On) an opinion profile over the DRF . The recursive aggregation of
P over the DRF is defined as a function R(P ) = (vR(P ), wR(P )), where
vR(P )(s) =
{
1∑
r∈R+(s) wR(P )(r)
∑
r∈R+(s) vR(P )(sr) · wR(P )(r) if R+(s) 6= ∅
vD(P )(s) otherwise
and wR(P )(r) =
1
n
∑n
i=1wi(r) for any statement s ∈ S and relationship r ∈ R.
Recall that R+(s) stands for the relationships connecting s to a descen-
dant sr of s through the relationship r.
Thus, the recursive function computes the average of the indirect collec-
tive opinion computed so far. In fact, we could say that, due to its recursive
character, the function computes the estimated opinion for each statement
in a bottom-up manner. Thus, the aggregation of opinions starts considering
the direct opinions at the “leaves” of the debate, namely at the statements
with no descendants, and moves up until reaching the targets.
Example 6.3. Figure 11 shows the aggregated (collective) valuations ob-
tained by the recursive aggregation function for the opinion profile of our
running example shown in figure 5. The aggregated acceptance degrees are
the same as in figure 9. Again, for the sake of illustrating the computa-
tion, please notice that we start by computing vR(s1) = vD(s1) = −0.33 and
vR(s5) = vD(s5) = −0.33 and, from these, we can compute vR(s4) = vR(s5) ·
w(r5)/w(r5) = −0.33, vR(s2) = vR(s4) · w(r4)/w(r4) = −0.33 = vR(s3) so to
finally compute vR(τ) = (−0.33·0.6−0.33·0.56−0.33·0.6−0.33·0.93)/2.69 =
−0.33.
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τs1 s2 s3
s4s5
vR(P )(τ) = −0.33
vR(P )(s1) = −0.33 vR(P )(s2) = −0.33 vR(P )(s3) = −0.33
vR(P )(s4) = −0.33vR(P )(s5) = −0.33
Figure 11: Recursive function: aggregated valuations
Similarly to what we did for the balanced function above, next we define
a family of aggregation functions based on combining the direct and recursive
aggregation functions.
Definition 6.5 (α-recursive aggregation). Let 〈S,R, T 〉 be a DRF and P =
(O1, . . . , On) an opinion profile over the DRF . Given the direct aggregation
D(P ) = (vD(P ), wD(P )), the recursive aggregation R(P ) = (vR(P ), wR(P )),
and α ∈ [0, 1], we define the aggregation function Rα(P ) = (vRα(P ), wRα(P )),
where:
vRα(P ) = α · vD(P ) + (1− α) · vR(P )
wRα(P )(r) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
wi(r)
for any statement s ∈ S and relationship r ∈ R. We say that Rα is an
α-recursive aggregation function.
7. Analysing opinion aggregation functions
In this section we compare the aggregation functions introduced in section
6 in terms of their satisfaction, or otherwise, of the social choice properties
introduced in section 5. Our analysis will run along two dimensions: (1)
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the coherence of an opinion profile; and (2) the consensus on the acceptance
degrees of an opinion profile. Thus, we will consider whether agents’ opinions
are constrained to be coherent (the opinion profile is coherent) or not , and
whether agents agree on acceptance degrees (there is consensus on acceptance
degrees) or not. This results in four debate scenarios to analyse:
1. Unconstrained opinion profiles;
2. Constrained opinion profiles: assuming consensus on acceptance de-
grees;
3. Constrained opinion profiles: assuming coherent profiles; and
4. Constrained opinion profiles: assuming consensus on acceptance de-
grees and coherent profiles.
The analysis of these scenarios will help us assess the price that must be paid
if the opinions stated by participating agents are not necessarily coherent.
The scenarios will also help us assess that must be paid when the relationships
between statements are opened for discussion by means of acceptance degrees.
Note that, in the interests of readability, we do not include the formal
analysis in the body of the paper. Rather we present the results of that
analysis. The formal analysis, both statements of results and the proofs of
the results, can be found in Appendix A.
7.1. Unconstrained opinion profiles
This is the most general scenario we can consider for analysis. We as-
sume unconstrained opinion profiles, which means that any opinion profile
is deemed to be possible input for the aggregation functions introduced in
Section 6. In other words, the domain of our aggregation functions is the
class O(DRF )n itself, and hence opinions need not to be coherent nor have
consensus on the acceptance degrees.
Table 3 displays the social choice properties fulfilled by the functions
defined in section 6 in this general case. There is one column per aggregation
function and one row per social choice property. Notice that we distinguish
between desirable social choice properties and other properties as discussed
in section 5.2. In the table, a green square (with a tick) indicates that
a property is fulfilled, while a red square (with a cross) indicates that a
property is not fulfilled. As to the more general aggregation functions, α-
B(alanced), and α-R(ecursive), in some cases we specify the values α for
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which a given property holds. Notice that, for both families, we show the
results considering α ∈ (0, 1), not considering 0 or 1, thus the cases for the
extreme values represent aggregations functions already displayed in other
columns.
Desirable properties D I R α-B α-R
Collective coherence 7 7 X 7 α < /2
Exhaustive domain X X X X X
Coherent domain X X X X X
Anonymity X X X X X
Non-dictatorship X X X X X
Sided Unanimity X 7 7 7 7
Weak Unanimity X 7 7 α > 1/2 α > 1/2
Endorsed Unanimity 7 X 7 α < 1/2 7
Familiar monotonicity X X 7 X 7
Other properties
Monotonicity X 7 7 7 7
Narrow Unanimity X 7 7 7 7
Independence X 7 7 7 7
Table 3: Social choice properties satisfied by aggregation functions D(irect), I(ndirect),
R(ecursive), α-B(alanced), and α-R(ecursive) for: (i) a general scenario considering uncon-
strained opinion profiles; (ii) a scenario considering constrained opinion profiles: consensus
on acceptance degrees.
Domain and anonymity. Table 3 shows that Exhaustive Domain (ED),
Coherent Domain, Anonymity and Non-dictatorship are fulfilled by all the
proposed opinion aggregation functions. This is because of the agnostic treat-
ment of opinion profiles implemented by the aggregation functions. Since no
constraints are imposed on opinion profiles received as input, ED is satis-
fied, and since no agent in an opinion profile receives a special treatment,
Anonymity holds. Satisfying this family of properties is important. On the
one hand, fulfilling ED ensures that any opinion profile is valid as input to a
collective opinion, that is, the aggregation functions do not filter out partic-
ipants’ opinions prior to computing a collective opinion. On the other hand,
satisfying Anonymity guarantees that all participants are equally important
when calculating a collective opinion.
Collective coherence. The (D)irect and (I)ndirect functions do not satisfy
collective coherence. As a result, neither does any α-Balanced aggregation
function because it results from the linear combination of D and I. The result
of such aggregation methods largely depends on the coherence of the opin-
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ion profile at hand, which in this scenario can be as incoherent as possible.
More positively, the (R)ecursive aggregation function does satisfy Collective
Coherence (CC). Out of the family of recursive aggregation functions (α-R),
which relies on D and R, those for which α < /2, where  is set to assess
the coherence of the output, also satisfy CC. This tells us that the closer is α
to 0 (the less the use of the direct opinion), the more coherent the collective
opinion obtained by an α-R function will be. The closer α is to /2, the less
coherent the collective opinion obtained by an α-R function will be. When α
goes beyond /2, the α-R function depends too much on the direct opinion
(which does not satisfy CC) and CC does not hold.
Unanimity. Narrow, Sided and Weak Unanimity are not satisfied by the
Indirect and Recursive aggregation functions. This is because the indirect
opinion, employed by all these aggregation functions, ignores unanimity on
the direct opinion of a statement and in some cases these functions can pro-
duce a result in the opposite direction. On the other hand, the Direct func-
tion, which only depends on the direct opinions of a statement, does satisfy
all the unanimity properties. This benefits the Balanced and Recursive fam-
ilies, which satisfy Weak unanimity for some values of α. Notice that only
Balanced and Recursive aggregation functions for which α is greater than
1/2 satisfy Weak unanimity. This is to lessen the influence of the indirect
opinion and sway the result towards the Direct aggregation function, which
does satisfy the property. Regarding the Narrow and Sided unanimity prop-
erties, not even the influence of the Direct function is enough to guarantee
that unanimity is preserved, and therefore no aggregation function in the
Balanced or Recursive families fulfil them for any value of α.
On the other hand, regarding Endorsed unanimity, the situation changes
for the Direct and Indirect functions. They flip sides so that the Direct
function does not fulfill Endorsed unanimity, but the Indirect function does.
This is because the unanimity in this case resides in indirect opinions, and
hence it is in line with the Indirect function, which only depends on indirect
opinions. However, this goes against the Direct function, which disregards
indirect opinions, and hence unanimity on its values. Conversely to the Weak
unanimity case for the Balanced family, now we need that the values of α are
less than 1/2 to sway the balanced aggregation towards the Indirect func-
tion, and hence, satisfy Endorsed unanimity. Next, although it might seem
reasonable that aggregation functions in the Recursive family also fulfil En-
dorsed unanimity, they do not. This is caused by the the recursive behaviour
of these aggregation functions, which can overlook unanimity on indirect
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opinions to use instead opinions deep in the debate on which there might
be no unanimity. And last, due to the failure of the Direct and Recursive
aggregation functions to fulfil Endorsed unanimity, so do all the aggregation
functions in the Recursive family, no matter the value of α.
Monotonicity. The Familiar Monotonicity property is fulfilled by the Direct
function (as a consequence of fulfilling Monotonicity), the Indirect function,
and therefore by the whole family of Balanced functions that are combi-
nations of the Direct and Indirect functions. The Recursive function, and
hence the Recursive family, fails to satisfy Familiar Monotonicity because
given a statement, the aggregated opinion about its descendants does not
solely depend on the valuations on these descendants alone. Instead, the ag-
gregated opinion about its descendants recursively depends on descendants
down the relational framework. Thus, changes of opinion on ”grandchildren”
statements can cause a change of opinion independently of any change of the
direct opinion.
Other properties. For the sake of completeness, next we also analyse the
fulfilment of further, non-desirable, properties. As expected, Independence
is not fulfilled by any of the function making use, at any degree, of indi-
rect opinion, namely the Indirect function, the Recursive function, and the
Balanced and Recursive families (for any α < 1). Also related to the use
of indirect opinions, we observe that Narrow Unanimity and Monotonicity
are not fulfilled by any of these four functions. Overall, these properties
can only be satisfied when employing the direct opinion alone to obtain the
aggregated collective opinion. This reinforces our discussion in section 5.2
about disregarding these properties to consider alternative properties more
orientated to aggregation functions that take account of dependencies.
7.2. Constrained opinions: assuming consensus on acceptance degrees
Assuming consensus on acceptances does not lead to any gain in the ful-
filment of social choice properties with respect to those already claimed in
section 7.1, so previous table 3 show the results for this scenario as well.
Nonetheless, we deemed worth analysing this debate scenario because of the
multiple already-in-use participation systems that do not allow participants
to value differently the relationships between sentences in a debate. In our
case, if we assume that participants agree on acceptance degrees, the collec-
tive opinion will only depend on valuations over sentences. This is equivalent
to considering a debate where participants are allowed to value sentences, but
do not express their opinions on the relationships between them.
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We refer the reader to Appendix A for the proofs regarding the fulfilment
of social choice properties in section 7.1. By analyising such proofs, we
observe that assuming consensus on acceptances does not yield any further
benefit that allows the hail the fulfilment of any social choice property that
did not hold in the analysis of section 7.1. This motivates that we have
decided not to include any additional proofs for this scenario in A.2. Hence,
the proofs in section 7.1 are also valid for this scenario.
7.3. Constrained opinions: assuming coherent profiles
In the following, we assume that the opinion profile in a debate is con-
strained to be coherent at some degree (according to some value  ∈ (0, 1)),
so that each of the opinions in the profile is always coherent. Recall that we
consider that coherence occurs when the direct and indirect opinions are in
line. Therefore, assuming coherence is expected to have a positive impact on
aggregation functions that exploit indirect opinions to compute a collective
opinion. Here we assess the gain.
Table 4 shows the desirable properties satisfied by our aggregation func-
tions when assuming coherence. The light green squares with check marks
identify properties that are now satisfied, but were not (in table 3) when
not imposing coherence. Therefore, assuming coherence yields new positive
results. More precisely, table 4 shows that assuming coherence leads to the
satisfaction of desirable unanimity properties for several of the functions.
First, given the coherence assumption, the unanimity on the direct opin-
ion drags the indirect opinion to become more similar to it, and therefore
the Indirect function gains Weak unanimity. Now, since the Direct function
also satisfies it, it follows that all α-Balanced functions now fulfil it too.
Furthermore, thanks to the alignment that the coherence assumption brings
between the direct and indirect opinions, the Direct function fulfils the En-
dorsed unanimity property. Therefore, having Endorsed unanimity fulfilled
now by the Indirect and Direct functions, the aggregation functions in the
Balanced family also fulfil it for any α.
Observe that unanimity and the coherence assumption work well together.
Unanimity on one sentence brings together its direct and indirect opinions,
making it impossible for both to be far apart, and therefore allowing the
Direct and Indirect functions to fulfill more unanimity properties.
Finally, the family of Recursive function now fulfils Endorsed unanimity,
though, not for any α. Depending on the degree of coherence allowed in the
opinion profile, i.e. the value of , the interval of α values allowing Rα to
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fulfil Endorsed unanimity will change. In this case, α has to be greater than
1/(2− ), representing the need to overcome the bad result obtained by the
Recursive function with respect to the Endorsed unanimity property.
Desirable properties D I R α-B α-R
Collective coherence 7 7 X 7 α < /2
Exhaustive domain X X X X X
Coherent domain X X X X X
Anonymity X X X X X
Non-dictatorship X X X X X
Sided Unanimity X 7 7 7 7
Weak Unanimity X X 7 X α > 1/2
Endorsed Unanimity X X 7 X α > 12−
Familiar monotonicity X X 7 X 7
Table 4: Highlighted, in light color, the fulfilment of additional desirable properties, on
top of those in Table 3, when assuming coherent opinions.
7.4. Constrained opinions: assuming consensus on acceptance degrees and
coherent profiles
In what follows we assume both previous constraints on the opinion pro-
files: coherence on the opinions and consensus on acceptances degrees. First,
consensus on acceptance degrees on relationships represents a more simplified
debate where participants only provide their opinions on sentences. Second,
the coherence assumed on opinions aligns direct and indirect opinions. Over-
all, both assumptions yield major benefits in terms of the satisfaction of
desired social choice properties, as we discuss next.
Table 5 shows the gain in fulfilment of desirable properties with respect
to table 4. The light green squares with check marks identify properties that
are now satisfied, but were not (in table 4) when not imposing consensus on
acceptance degrees. Now, besides the aggregation functions in the Recursive
family, which now satisfies Collective coherence for any α, the rest of ag-
gregation functions under study also satisfy -Collective coherence when the
opinion profiles are δ-coherent, 0 < δ ≤ .
This major improvement is because the consensus on acceptance degrees
forbids the participants to value a relationship as 0, which is key to ensure
collective coherence for the Direct and Indirect functions when the opinion
profiles are coherent. We assume that for each relationship at least one agent
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has valued it other than 0, because otherwise it would be as if the relationship
did not exist, and this forces all the participants to have a positive value too.
In this manner, if we have both -coherent opinions and consensus, then
all our aggregation functions can guarantee -coherent aggregated opinions,
which may increase the acceptability of the results from the participants.
Notice that assuming consensus on acceptance degrees is quite reasonable.
Indeed, we believe that such consensus is actually very likely to be found in
many debates where the relationships are classified first and afterwards the
participants are allowed to give their opinions. Our model can fit perfectly
with these kinds of scenario by setting all the acceptance degrees as a constant
value for every participant. Furthermore, the procedure to create the debate,
and therefore the DRF, could be adapted so there is a first stage in which a
collective value is established for each of the relationships, and then there is
a second stage in which values are assigned to the statements.
Desirable properties D I R α-B α-R
Collective coherence X X X X X
Exhaustive domain X X X X X
Coherent domain X X X X X
Anonymity X X X X X
Non-dictatorship X X X X X
Sided Unanimity X 7 7 7 7
Weak Unanimity X X 7 X α > 1/2
Endorsed Unanimity X X 7 X α > 12−
Familiar monotonicity X X 7 X 7
Table 5: Highlighted, in light color, the fulfilment of additional desirable properties, on
top of those in Table 4, when assuming coherent opinions and consensus on acceptance
degrees.
7.5. Summary
From the analysis for each debate scenario above, we can draw the fol-
lowing general observations:
• The aggregation functions of the recursive family achieve collective co-
herence provided that they place little weight on direct opinions (or
opinions are coherent and there is consensus on acceptance degrees).
• Coherence in opinion profiles favours unanimity (specifically, WU and
EU), though in different ways. I and α-Balanced are fully satisfied,
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while the family of recursive functions leans on the direct aggregation
function to fulfil some unanimity properties with restrictions. As a
result, the α-Recursive family only satisfy WU and EU under strong
conditions on α, because the R function never satisfies them.
• Coherent opinion profiles are not enough for D, I, and α-Balanced func-
tions to achieve collective coherence. They also require consensus on
acceptance degrees. Recursive functions do not require such consen-
sus (in fact, not even the non-coherent opinion profiles), and hence
they are robust to the divergence of opinions on the relations between
statements in a debate.
• While the D, I, Bα functions manage to achieve familiar monotonicity
in all scenarios, the aggregation functions in the recursive family can-
not even when counting on coherent opinion profiles and consensus on
acceptance degrees. This is because the aggregated opinion on descen-
dants recursively depends on descendants down the relational model.
Thus, changes of opinion on “grandchildren” or further down sentences
can cause a change of opinion independently of any change of the direct
opinion.
Based on these general observations above, it is the task of the deci-
sion maker to decide the aggregation operator to choose considering: (1)
the features of the debate scenario at hand; and (2) the desirable proper-
ties to guarantee. As a rule of thumb, since in actual-world debates we
cannot assume individual rationality (coherence), we believe that recursive
aggregation functions are the best choice to achieve collective rationality,
though we would pay the price of losing some other valuable properties, in
particular unanimity for values of α that promote a large use of the direct
opinion. Otherwise, if we do not value the coherence of the collective output,
or we can guarantee somehow that the opinions of participants are coher-
ent and the participatory system at hand does not allow for divergence on
acceptances degrees, the Direct function becomes the aggregation function
of choice. Within such constrained settings, the Direct aggregation function
fulfils almost every property considered, enve all of them in the debate sce-
nario in section 7.4. We conclude that it seems a good trade-off to consider
the Recursive family, which can behave as similar to the Direct or to the Re-
cursive function as wanted, and set the value of α depending on the features
and goals in hand.
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8. Computational Analysis
The purpose of this section is twofold. First, given the opinion aggre-
gation problem in section 5.1, we explain the complexity of the different
algorithms for computing a collective decision on its target. In particular,
we provide an algorithm for computing the recursive aggregation function.
Thereafter, in section 8.2, we empirically analyse the use of that algorithm
to solve real-world collective decision problems.
8.1. Computing Aggregation Functions
Algorithm 1 Compute recursive aggregation
1: function ComputeRecursiveAggregation(〈S,R, T 〉, (O1, . . . , On))
2: for each relationship r ∈ R do . Compute averaged acceptances
3: aggregated acceptance[r]← average acceptances(w1(r), . . . , wn(r))
4: H(〈S,R, T 〉)← DRF to B-hypergraph(〈S,R, T 〉) . Generate B-hypergraph
reprentation of DRF
5: sorted sentences ← reverse(topological sorting(H(〈S,R, T 〉))) . Compute
topological sorting of the DRF B-hypergraph
6: for s in sorted sentences do . Compute aggregated valuations
7: valuation[s] ← 0 . To accumulate aggregated valuations over descendants
8: normaliser[s] ← 0 . To normalise aggregated valuations over descendants
9: compute relationships R(s) to descendants
10: if R(s) 6= ∅ then . if s has descendants
11: for each relationship r ∈ R(s) do
12: sr ← descendant from relationship r
13: valuation[s] ← valuation[s] + aggregated valuation[sr] · aggre-
gated acceptance[r]
14: normaliser[s] ← normaliser[s] + aggregated acceptance[r]
15: valuation[s] ← valuation[s] / normaliser[s]
16: else . s has no descendants
17: valuation[s] ← average valuations(v1(s), . . . , vn(s))
18: aggregated valuation[s] ← valuation[s]
19: return aggregated valuation,aggregated acceptance
All of the aggregation functions proposed in Section 6 can be calculated
by tractable algorithms. For example, the direct function calculates the aver-
age for all statements and relationships in a DRF 〈S,R, T 〉 considering the
direct opinions in an opinion profile P = (O1, . . . , On). Hence, its complexity
is given by O((|R|+|S|)×|P |), where |R|, |S| are the number of relationships
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and statements, respectively; and |P | is the number of opinions in an opin-
ion profile. Computing the indirect and balanced functions can be done by
calculating the aggregated acceptance of each relationship as an average and
by calculating the aggregated valuation of each statement as the average of
the estimation function, which in turn is an average of the indirect opinions
for that statement. Hence, their complexity is given by O(|R| × |S| × |P |).
The calculation of the recursive function can be done by calculating the ag-
gregated acceptance of each relationship as an average and calculating the
aggregated valuation of each statement by starting with statements with no
descendants and using these results to calculate the aggregated valuation of
the statements directly connected to them. For example, algorithm 1 con-
tains the pseudocode for the recursive function. In particular, the algorithm
starts by computing aggregated acceptances (wR(P )) as a weighted average
(lines 2-3), which has a complexity of O(|R| × |P |). Then, the algorithm
computes aggregated valuations (vR(P )) starting from the statements with
no descendants. In order to do that, we first perform a topological sorting
of the DRF. This can be achieved by: (1) transforming the graph associated
to the DRF into an acyclic B-hypergraph10, denoted by H(〈S,R, T 〉) (line
4); and (2) then performing the topological sorting over the B-hypergraph
(line 5). Starting from the sentences without descendants, the algorithm
computes aggregated valuations until reaching the statements in T (lines 5-
18). The calculation of the topological sorting for B-hypergraphs has been
studied in [44]11 and has a complexity of O(|R| × |S|). The calculation of
the aggregated valuations has a complexity of O(|S| × max(|R|, |P |)). In
10B-hypergraphs are a particular type of hypergraph with efficient algorithms for path
finding[44]. Obtaining a B-hypergraph from a DRF is straightforward. In fact, the graph
associated with a DRF is a B-hypergraph with the exception of the relationships that
connect the very same statements. For instance, consider relationships r1 and r6 in figure
4 linking τ to s1. Since in a hypergraph there cannot be two or more hyperedges over the
very same nodes, we will only consider one single hyperedge. In our example, it suffices
to consider either r1 or r6. We do not lose anything by doing this simplification because
we want to obtain the topological sorting of a DRF, and hence considering one of the
relationships connecting the very same statements is enough.
11In particular, [44] provides an algorithm to calculate the inverse topological sorting
in a F-hypergraph. Any given B-hypergraph can be transformed into a symmetric F-
hypergraph by changing the direction of the hyperedges. Note the inverse topological
sorting of the symmetric F-hypergraph coincides with the topological sorting in the original
B-hypergraph.
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real debates the number of opinions is usually significantly higher than the
number of relationships, hence, the complexity of the calculation of aggre-
gated valuations is given by O(|S| × |P |). Thus, the total complexity of the
recursive functions is O(|R| × |P |).
In https://bitbucket.org/jariiia/workspace/projects/DRF we pro-
vide a publicly-available implementation of algorithm 1 together with all the
aggregation functions defined in this paper. Furthermore, we also provide
guidelines to reproduce the experiments reported in section 8.2 below.
8.2. Empirical Analysis
In what follows we empirically analyse the time required by our imple-
mentation of algorithm 1 to compute collective decisions. Our purpose is to
investigate whether our approach can handle collective decision making in
practice.
Based on the analysis above, we generated debates, which required to
the synthetic generation of DRFs and opinion profiles. On the one hand,
we artificially generated DRFs whose sentences are the nodes of a directed
acyclic B-hypergraph and whose hyperedges represent the relationships be-
tween sentences. We chose the number of sentences in our synthetic DRFs
within {100, 150, 200} to represent small, medium and large scenarios. Re-
garding the relationships between sentences, we considered two parameters:
• Density of relationships. Given a relationship r = (Σ, s), we say that
the number of sentences in Σ is the density of r. Since each relation-
ship is represented as a hyperedge in a B-hypergraph, the density of
relationships amounts to the size of the tails of hyperedges in the hy-
pergraph. The (average) density of relationships in our artificial DRFs
took values within {1, 2, 3}. We set the density value to 1 to generate
DRFs for which there is a one-to-one connection between sentences,
and so each DRF is in fact a DAG. As to the other two density values
(2 and 3), they allow us to generate DRFs where each relationship has
two sentences connected to one sentence, and three sentences connected
to one sentence respectively.
• Density of number of relationships, namely the average number of sen-
tences to which each sentence is connected to through relationships.
This corresponds to the average out degree of each sentence in the
DRF. We chose values for this parameter within {1, 2.5, 5} to generate
DRFs with low, medium, and high density of relationships.
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On the other hand, to finish generating a debate, we must generate
opinion profiles. We generated profiles with number of opinions within
{106, 3 · 106, 5 · 106}, to represent the largest known actual-world scenar-
ios12. The values for valuations and acceptances were randomly generated
within [−1, 1] and [0, 1] respectively.
All the computations of collective decisions four our artificially generated
debates were performed on an Ubuntu 16.04 box with an Intel(R) Core(TM)
i7-8700K CPU @ 3.70GHz, with 31GiB system memory, and 8th Gen Core
Processor Host Bridge/DRAM R. Furthermore, our experiments only con-
sidered the recursive aggregation function (specified in algorithm 1) because
it is the more expensive out of those introduced in section 5.
We performed three types of analysis:
• Sensitivity to number of participants. Figure 12 shows that the time
to compute collective decisions increases as the number of participants
increases. The figure shows the results for a medium density of number
of relationships and a low density of relationships (which is the most
expensive case as we discuss below).
• Sensitivity to density of number of relationships. Figure 13 shows that
the time to compute collective decisions increases as the density of num-
ber of relationships grows. Notice though most actual-world scenarios
would lie between the low and medium cases, and hence it would take
less than one second to solve even the largest debate.
• Sensitivity to density of relationships. Figure 14 shows that the time
to compute collective decisions decreases as the density of relationships
increases. The figure shows the results for 3·106 opinions and a medium
density of number of relationships. This tells you that in fact, our
12To the best of our knowledge, the Brexit discussion on UK [71] constitutes the largest
such discussion: news outlets reported when the number of supporters passed 2 million [13]
and the numbers kept growing during the 6 month period that the discussion was open.
By the time it closed, there were 6,103,056 participants [71]. Contrasting numbers of
participants can be found for other popular initiatives such as an environmental proposal
in Parlement et Citoyens which had 51,493 votes [68] and in the participatory budgeting
process in Helsinki [25] with 54,246 registered people, which represents 10% of the city
voters. Note that the Parlement et Citoyens and Helsinki debates are probably more
representative of real online debates than the Brexit example, where participants were, in
effect, just voting on a specific proposal.
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algorithm needs more time when relationships between sentences are
one-to-one.
Overall, notice that computing collective decisions in all the artificially
generated debates took less than 1.6 seconds. Therefore, we can conclude
that our opinion aggregation functions can be employed to cope with large-
scale debates in real time.
Figure 12: Sensitivity to number of participants in a DRF. The results show the compu-
tational time required by the recursive aggregation function as the number of sentences
grow.
Figure 13: Sensitivity to density of relationships in a DRF. Density is considered in terms
of the average out degree of sentences: low (2.0), medium (5.0), high (10.0). The results
show the computational time required by the recursive aggregation function for 3 · 106
opinions as the number of sentences grow.
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Figure 14: Sensitivity to the number of sentences in the source of a relationship (size
of the tail of hypergraph edges). The results show the computational time required by
the recursive aggregation function as the number of sentences grow and as the size of
hyperedges (tails) grows.
9. Related Work
In this section we review the work from the literature that is closest to
the work in this paper. That includes work which has focused on support
for online discussions, on approaches for computing the outcome of a set of
arguments, and on analysing the behaviour of discussions from the standpoint
of social choice theory. We discuss work in these three areas separately below,
acknowledging that some work could validly be considered under more than
one heading.
9.1. Tools for online discussion
As mentioned above, we see this work as being inspired by work on on-
line discussion forums such as Decidim Barcelona [30], Better Reykjav´ık [16],
Decide Madrid [29], and Parlement et Citoyens [69], where participants can
carry out a structured discussion around some topic, typically a policy pro-
posal. These particular sites allow participants to offer arguments for and
against a proposal , and vote(/support) for it in the context of a specific
institution. However, some of the citizen participation tools behind some of
these sites, such as Decidim [31] for Barcelona or Consul [27] for Madrid,
have been used in other cities and organisations. Thus, for example, City of
Helsinki [25] applies an instance of Decidim and the New York City Partic-
ipatory Budgeting [67] is based on Consul. Other participatory tools have
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also proliferated outside the context of public institutions. There, we find:
consider.it [26], Appgree [4], and Baoqu [9] whose main focus is scala-
bility – making the systems fit for use by large numbers of participants –;
Loomio [50, 59], where participants can both comment on proposals, albeit
in an unstructured way, and also vote on them; or Kialo [51], which organises
debates in an structured way. What distinguishes our work from all of these
approaches is that, as discussed in Section 2, we provide a much more ex-
pressive framework than any existing participation system. First, the DRF
makes it possible to express opinions about both statements and relation-
ships between statements, and, similarly to [37, 56, 12], it allows opinions
to be expressed using real values, unlike most e-participation systems, which
limit to allowing users to express agreement or disagreement with arguments.
Second, our framework has been conceived to support relationships involving
multiple statements, hence going beyond the limiting pairwise relationships
supported by current e-participation systems.
There is also a long-standing line of work which develops tools to map the
structure of arguments on some topic. This line of work draws from a range
of sources, nicely summarized in [82], and is exemplified by [21, 79, 84, 87].
The focus of this work is on drawing the relationships between arguments
as a means of helping people understand the scenarios, and as [14, 49, 80]
point out, the resulting maps can be used to support group decision-making.
However, all these approaches deal only with visual representation of the
arguments — there is no attempt to compute a summary of the discussion.
In contrast, our focus is on using the results of debate as input to a compu-
tational process, rather than providing support for the debate itself. In that
sense our work could be viewed as a post-processing stage that could be ap-
plied in conjunction with any of the tools listed above to support structured
discussion. Indeed, the generality of the relational model means that it is
well-fitted to such a task.
There are other approaches that allow for structured argument-based dis-
cussions and aim to compute the outcome of the discussion. One notable
body of research here is Klein’s work on the Deliberatorium [52, 53] which
allows for the presentation of arguments and their interactions, and aggre-
gates the opinions. Unlike our work, there is no analysis of the properties of
the aggregation with respect to social choice principles.
In contrast to the work discussed so far, where participants in the debate
have the task of structuring their arguments into the correct format, [19]
considers extracting arguments from natural language texts and constructing
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a formal argumentation representation from them. Such a representation
can then be summarised as discussed in [78]. [12] discusses how this kind
of approach can be combined with the argumentation-visualization methods
described above.
9.2. Computational argumentation
Computational argumentation [76] has a lengthy history within artificial
intelligence, going back at least as far as [40, 63].
At the time of writing, work in this area is split into two broad groups.
First, historically, is work which is concerned with the internal structure of
arguments — what arguments are constructed from, and how this construc-
tion takes place. Early examples of this work include those cited above,
along with [41] and [54], [60], [70], and [74]. This line of work has reached
its current endpoint with structured argumentation systems like logic-based
argumentation [15], assumption-based argumentation [36] and structured ar-
gumentation systems such as aspic+ [65], and DeLP [47]. Second is the line
of work on abstract argumentation, begun by [35], which focuses much less
on the internal structure of arguments, and instead is mainly concerned with
the relationships between arguments. This has led to a large body of work
expanding on [35], for example [10, 64, 89]. In [35], the focus is solely on
“attack” relations, where arguments are in conflict, and subsequent work has
expanded the scope to consider “support” relations as well [3, 22, 23].
There is another way to, broadly, classify work on argumentation into
two groups. One line of work, again exemplified by [35], focuses on argu-
mentation as a mechanism for extracting consistent points of view from an
inconsistent knowledge base. The other line of work deals with how argu-
ments combine, or accrue, in favour of, or against some conclusion. This
distinction cuts across the structured/abstract distinction with, for example
[10] being concerned with consistency in abstract argumentation, and [65]
dealing with consistency in structured argumentation. On the other hand,
[15, 73, 88] discuss accrual in structured argumentation, while [22] looks at
accrual in abstract argumentation.
The work mentioned above uses argumentation as a mechanism for a
single entity to come to a conclusion. However, as [85, 90] and others have
pointed out, argumentation is also a natural mechanism for multiple entities
to use to reach consensus on some topic. As a result, argumentation has been
used [2, 62] in multiagent systems as a mechanism for rational interaction
[61] for a particular meaning of “rational”. That is “rational” in the sense
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that each stage in the interaction is supported by well-founded reasons. Here
we build upon this prior work in rational interaction. Our approach allows
participants in a discussion to put forward opinions about some topic under
discussion, opinions that may be either in favour or against the topic.
Our work connects to several of these themes in argumentation. First,
since we are interested in aggregating the opinion from a number of partici-
pants, our work is clearly related to the use of argumentation in multiagent
interaction. Second, the fact that individual steps in the participants’ reason-
ing process are represented in our approach means that our work is connected
to work on structured argumentation. (We would argue that it is more ab-
stract, since the relationships that connect statements are not restricted to
be rules as in [36, 47, 65]). Third, our work connects with the idea of ar-
gumentation as a means of extracting a coherent view from a number of
conflicting opinions. The fact that this coherent view takes into account the
votes of participants also gives our work a fourth connection with the argu-
mentation literature, in its relation to work on accrual. This voting aspect
also places our work in close relation to that of social argumentation [56, 75],
and previous work on collective argumentation13 [7, 20, 46] which we will
discuss more below. Finally, one might view our work as being about the
combination of different sets of arguments, one for each person who votes
on the arguments or the relationships between them. From that perspective,
our work also connects with that of [28], which takes as input different sets
of arguments and relationships between then, and outputs consistent sets of
arguments, thus “merging” the input sets. See [18] for a survey of work on
this topic, and [24] for an excellent short overview of developments to date.
9.3. Social choice theory
Given a set of alternatives and a set of agents who possess preference
relations over the alternatives, social choice theory focuses on how to yield a
collective choice that appropriately reflects the agents’ individual preferences
[8]. With this aim, social choice theory has extensively explored many ways
of aggregating agents’ individual preferences [43]. Since there is a consensus
in the literature on the desirable properties that a “fair” way of aggregating
preferences should satisfy (e.g. no single agent can impose their view on the
13Note that our work, and [7, 20, 46] has little commonality with the “collective argu-
mentation” of [17], which is concerned with argumentation in which relationships exist
between sets of arguments.
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aggregate; if all agents agree, the aggregate must reflect the agreement; and so
on [43]), aggregation functions can be characterised and compared in terms of
the desirable properties they satisfy. Notice though that social choice theory
counts on multiple negative results, namely impossibility results showing the
incompatibility of certain sets of desirable properties (e.g. Arrow’s famous
impossibility theorem [5]).
Much of the work in social choice theory has placed little emphasis on the
structure of the objects over which agents are expressing their preferences.
However, there is a growing body of research that takes the subject of the
preferences to be arguments in some form or other. Here the foundational
work was that of [77], later developed in [7], which considered — from one
perspective — the very same problem that we tackle here: given a topic of
discussion and a set of agents expressing their individual opinions about the
statements made in the discussion, how can the agents reach a collectively
rational decision?. The way that this is tackled in [7], as [18] explains, is as a
version of the “merging” problem mentioned above. That is, [7] consider each
participant to have a set of arguments, and the relationships between them,
and an opinion about which arguments are labelled as being acceptable and
which are not. The problem they then solve is how to compute a set of labels
for the arguments that reflect the opinions of all the participants such that
the aggregation of opinions satisfies desirable social choice properties The
same problem was, subsequent to [77] but before the extended treatment in
[7], considered by [20], and more recently by us in [46]. As [6] points out, [7]
and [20] take different approaches, with [7] considering the opinions as votes,
resolved by taking the plurality for individual arguments, while [20] offers a
range of operators that yield a labelling which confirms to the constraints of
argumentation semantics14 while also not disagreeing with the opinions of any
participant. [6] compares the plurality approach with one of the operators
[20] using human participants.
The recent work in [24] can be viewed as an extension of the line of work
in [7, 20]. Like [7, 20], [24] proposes methods for aggregating a collection
of individual argumentation frameworks, corresponding to participants in a
debate, into a single argumentation framework that appropriately reflects
the views of the group as a whole. [24] investigates the properties of the
aggregation rules introduced in the paper, and, like ours, the work employs
14The resulting labellings are either admissible or complete [35].
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techniques from social choice theory in this analysis. However, the aim is
different. In [24] the aim is to analyse aggregation rules in terms of their
preservation of semantic properties of argumentation framework, while our
focus in this paper is on social choice properties of the aggregation operators.
From the perspective of argumentation, the major difference between
[7, 20, 24] and our work in [46] and this paper is that we do not start from a set
of opinions that are well-formed in an argumentation sense. [46], which does
directly use the notion of arguments and labels (though the work is based on
a variation on bipolar argumentation [3]) does not, unlike [7, 20], start from
a “legal” [11] labelling. Similarly here we do not require any consistency of
opinions. In both cases this is because we want to represent human opinions
that may not be rational in an argumentation-theoretic sense.
Finally, a rather different line of work (and one that seems to have no
knowledge of [7, 20, 24]) is that of [75], which extends the QuAD framework
first introduced in [12] to deal with multiple agent debates. Similarly to our
work in [45, 46], the QuAD-V framework in [75] allows pro and con argu-
ments (attackers and defenders in our terminology) and agents’ votes over
arguments (labels). However, the main focus of the work is not on computing
a collective opinion, but on the agents contribute with individually rational
opinions, a weaker version of our notion of coherent labelling defined in [46].
This contrasts with our focus on the design of aggregation functions that
satisfy desirable social choice properties, particularly collective rationality
(strict rationality in Rago and Toni’s terms), without requiring agents to be
individually rational.
Beyond that, the major difference between the work in this paper and
what has been done before is the richness of the representation. Here there
are three main extensions. First, [7, 20, 24, 46] and [75] all deal with abstract
arguments. Here we deal with structured objects, and, as already mentioned,
these are objects that are more general than the usual object studied in
structured argumentation since we place no real constraints on the kind of
reasoning captured by the relationships that hold between statements. Sec-
ond, unlike previous work, we allow opinions to be expressed both about
individual statements and the relations between them. This combines what
has been studied in [7, 20, 24, 46, 75], where opinions are expressed about
individual arguments, but not the relations between them (these are assumed
to be fixed), and [56], where opinions are expressed about the relationships
between arguments but not about the arguments themselves. Third, we al-
low opinions to be real-valued. In this we move away from the labellings
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studied in [7, 20, 46], and their grounding in argumentation semantics, and
towards the kind of representation allowed in [56, 75].
Finally, following the assumptions already established in [46], we neither
assume independence between arguments as a fundamental postulate as is
the case in [7, 20, 24], nor do we require the resulting aggregation to agree
with an argumentation semantics. We will deal with these differences in turn.
Dropping the independence of arguments should come as no surprise since
[7] questions the necessity of assuming independence because of the depen-
dencies between arguments that come already encoded in the form of re-
lationships such as attack. Despite the importance of independence as a
fundamental property in the judgement aggregation literature because of its
theoretical value in proving strategy-proofness and strategic manipulation15,
we are not alone in regarding independence as too strong a property. This is
because together with mild further conditions, it implies dictatorship [55] and
because it is also considered as not very plausible [66]. This explains why re-
laxing independence has been subject of much research (e.g. [34, 55, 66, 72]).
This paper goes beyond relaxing independence. Rather, in this paper we in-
troduce several opinion aggregation functions that use the participants’ opin-
ions to compute a collective opinion while considering dependencies between
statements. This is in line with our former work in [46], but here we allow
to express dependencies between multiple statements per relationship, while
[46] (and all the work which starts with abstract argumentation frameworks
such as [7, 20, 24, 75]) constrain relationships, and thus dependencies, to
exist between pairs of arguments, hence limiting expressiveness.
Turning to the fact that the result of our aggregations do not match an
standard argumentation semantics, we substitute the notion of “coherence
of opinions” for the form of rationality embodied by those semantics. We
do this for reasons that we have already touched on above with respect to
the input opinions — we feel that insisting on an output that is rational
in an argumentation theoretic sense is not necessarily realistic given that
we start from opinions that are put forward by human participants who
may not be not consistent in their views. Instead of forcing the output of
aggregation to be rational in an argumentation theoretic sense, we instead
compute a measure which assesses how much concordance there is between
15If the independence criterion is not satisfied, then the function aggregating judgements
is not immune to strategic manipulation [33].
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related opinions, and assess our novel aggregation functions by the degree to
which they can assure that their output ensures collective coherence.
Finally, from a pure social choice (not a combined argumentation and so-
cial choice) perspective notice, that it is common in the literature on judge-
ment aggregation and preference aggregation to impose properties on the
objects under aggregation in order that aggregation operators can guarantee
desirable properties. For instance, in the case of distance-based aggregators,
the Kemeny rule [38] only considers consistent judgement sets, and hence dis-
regards those which are not, whereas premise-based aggregators [38] typically
make assumptions on the agenda to guarantee consistency and completeness.
Our work does not rely on this structuring of the target objects of the aggre-
gation operators. Instead, we have introduced aggregation operators capable
of guaranteeing collective coherence when opinions are unconstrained. This
is motivated by the need for disregarding rationality when humans are in-
volved in debates, since their opinions may eventually contain contradictions
and inconsistencies.
10. Conclusions and future work
There is an emerging interest in the use of information and communi-
cation systems to allow citizens to participate in the governance process.
These e-participation systems aim to strengthen the collaboration between
governments and citizens, and to empower citizens in participating in pol-
icy decision-making. The majority of such systems allow citizens to express
their views on particular issues, but they either fail to aggregate the different
views in a meaningful way, or they aggregate in a way that limits users to just
voting in favour of or against an issue. Current research in the areas of so-
cial choice and argumentation could help to formally represent richer human
debates in e-participation systems and to define computational processes for
aggregating users views. However, approaches belonging to these areas have
two main drawbacks that significantly decrease their potential as a solution
for real e-participation systems. Firstly, they assume that participants agree
on the structure of a debate, that is the pieces of information that are rele-
vant to particular issues and the relationships among them. Secondly, they
assume that users opinions are rational, which is too restrictive for human
participants.
To address these limitations, we have proposed a model to represent and
reason about human debates. Our model allows users not only to introduce
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new pieces of information to the discussion and relate them to existing pieces
but also to express disagreement with the relationships put forward by other
users. In addition, our model does not assume that users opinions are rational
and we define a weaker notion of rationality to characterise coherent user
opinions. Considering the degree of coherence of individual users opinions
and the level of consensus that users have about the debate structure among
users, we analyse the outcomes of different opinion aggregation functions
in terms of social choice properties. Our analysis demonstrates that the
recursive aggregation method could compute a coherent collective opinion
even if individual opinions are incoherent and there is a lack of consensus
on the debate structure. As we impose more restrictions on the coherence
of individual opinions and consensus among users on the debate structure,
more aggregation methods also compute coherent collective opinions. We
conclude our analysis with a computational evaluation in which we study
the computational cost of aggregating collective opinions and experimentally
demonstrate that collective opinions can be computed efficiently for real-sized
debates.
There are several lines of future work that we have in mind. On the
theoretical side, we are investigating methods to analyse the quality of a
debate represented in the relational model. For example, we are studying
the use of systematic incoherence in participant opinions as a way to identify
structural problems in a debate. On the practical side, we are planning to
evaluate the practical impact of using the relational model in real online
debates. We have already evaluated [81] an earlier debate model [46] using
data from Decidim Barcelona, and intend to do the same for the relational
model.
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Appendix A. Formal proofs and results
In the following, we prove all the formal results presented in section 7
regarding the satisfaction of social choice properties by the opinion aggrega-
tion functions introduced in section 6.The section is divided into four parts,
one per debate scenario as analysed in section 7.
1. Unconstrained opinion profiles;
2. Constrained opinion profiles: assuming consensus on acceptance de-
grees;
3. Constrained opinion profiles: assuming coherent profiles; and
4. Constrained opinion profile: assuming consensus on acceptance degrees
and coherent profiles.
Furthermore, for each scenario, our results will be grouped by aggregation
function according to the following order: Direct aggregation, Indirect ag-
gregation, Recursive aggregation, Balanced family aggregation and Recursive
family aggregation
A.1. Unconstrained opinion profiles
In this section we analyse the social choice properties fulfilled by the ag-
gregation functions introduced in Section 6: assuming unconstrained opinions
profiles (any opinion profile is deemed to be possible input for the aggregation
functions). The results of this section are summarised in table 3 in section
7.1.
Proposition A.1. The aggregation function D satisfies the following prop-
erties:
(i) Exhaustive Domain and Coherent Domain;
(ii) Anonymity and Non-Dictatorship;
(iii) Monotonicity and Familiar Monotonicity;
(iv) Narrow Unanimity, Sided Unanimity and Weak Unanimity; and
(v) Independence.
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And does not satisfy:
(vi) Collective coherence; and
(vii) Endorsed Unanimity.
Proof. (of proposition A.1)
(i) Exhaustive Domain is straightforward and Collective Domain follows
directly.
(ii) Anonymity and Non-Dictatorship. Let P = (O1, . . . , On) be an opinion
profile over a DRF and σ a permutation over a set of agents Ag =
{1, . . . , n}. We must show that D maintains the same collective opinion
over the permuted opinion profile P ′ = (Oσ(1), . . . , Oσ(n)), i.e. that
D(P ) = D(P ′). This is the case because the next two equalities hold:
vD(P )(s) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
vi(s) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
vσ(i)(s) = vD(P ′)(a);
wD(P )(r) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
wi(r) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
wσ(i)(r) = wD(P ′)(r).
Therefore, Anonymity holds and Non-Dictatorship follows from it as
we discussed in section 5.2.
(iii) Monotonicity and Familiar Monotonicity. Let s be a statement and
P and P ′ two opinion profiles satisfying the Monotonicity assumptions
in the definition of the property in section 9.3, i.e. P = (O1, . . . , On)
and P = (O′1, . . . , O
′
n) are such that vi(s) ≤ v′i(s) for every agent i ∈
{1, . . . , n}. Then, from the definition of D, we obtain the aggregated
valuation on s is:
vD(P )(s) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
vi(s) ≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
v′i(s) = vD(P ′)(s)
Therefore, D satisfies Monotonicity. Hence, from this and lemma 5.2,
Familiar Monotonicity also holds.
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(iv) Narrow Unanimity, Sided Unanimity and Weak Unanimity. Let P =
(O1, . . . , On) be an opinion profile over a DRF and a statement s ∈ S
such that vi(s) = λ for every agent in Ag = {1, . . . , n}. The aggregated
opinion on s is:
vD(P )(s) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
vi(s) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
λ = λ
Hence, Narrow unanimity is fulfilled by D. As discussed in section 9.3,
Weak Unanimity follows from Narrow Unanimity. Furthermore, accord-
ing to proposition 5.2 Sided Unanimity follows from Narrow Unanimity
and Monotonicity.
(v) Independence follows directly from the fact that D satisfies Monotonic-
ity and from proposition 5.3.
(vi) Collective Coherence. To prove that it does not hold, it suffices to find
a DRF and an opinion profile for which there is no collective coherence.
Thus, consider the example depicted below in figure A.15.
s a
v(a) = −1v(s) = 1
w(r) = 1
Figure A.15
If we check coherence for statement s, we obtain that:
|vD(P )(s)− eD(P )(s)| = v(s)− v(a) = 2 > .
for any  ∈ (0, 1), and hence collective coherence does not hold for this
profile.
(vii) Endorsed Unanimity. Using the opinion profile depicted in figure A.15,
we observe that even with full negative support on s (i.e. v(a) = −1),
the result of the aggregation is the opposite (vD(P )(s) = 1). Therefore,
this opinion profile also serves as a counterexample to prove that D
does not satisfy Endorsed Unanimity.
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Proposition A.2. The aggregation function I satisfies the following prop-
erties:
(i) Exhaustive Domain and Coherent Domain;
(ii) Anonymity and Non-Dictatorship;
(iii) Endorsed Unanimity; and
(iv) Familiar Monotonicity.
And does not satisfy:
(v) Collective coherence;
(vi) Narrow Unanimity, Sided Unanimity and Weak Unanimity;
(vii) Monotonicity; and
(viii) Independence.
Proof. (of proposition A.2)
(i) Exhaustive and Coherent domain are straighforward.
(ii) Anonymity and Non-Dictadorship. Let P = (O1, . . . , On) be an opin-
ion profile over a DRF and σ a permutation over the agent in Ag =
{1, . . . , n}. We must show that I maintains the same collective opin-
ion over the permuted opinion profile P ′ = (Oσ(1), . . . , Oσ(n)), i.e. that
I(P ) = I(P ′).
For any i ∈ {1, . . . , n} there is only one j ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that σ(j) =
i, and hence in terms of expectation functions we know that ei = eσ(j).
Using that, we can show that I(P ) = I(P ′) as follows:
vI(P )(s) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
ei(s) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
eσ(i)(s) = vI(P ′)(a);
wI(P )(r) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
wi(r) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
wσ(i)(r) = wI(P ′)(r)
.
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(iii) Endorsed Unanimity. Let s be a sentence and P = (O1, . . . , On) an
opinion profile satisfying that vi(sr) = 1 for any agent i and descendant
sr ∈ D(s) of sentence s. Since the expectation over s is:
ei(s) =
1∑
r∈R+(s)wi(r)
∑
r∈R+(s)
wi(r)vi(sr) =
1∑
r∈R+(s)wi(r)
∑
r∈R+(s)
wi(r) = 1,
then the aggregated value for s is:
vI(P )(s) =
1
n
∑
i
ei(s) = 1.
Analogously, if we assume that vi(sr) = −1 for any agent i and de-
scendant sr ∈ D(s) of sentence s, we would obtain that vI(P )(s) = −1.
Since vI(P )(s) > 0 when there is full positive support (and vI(P )(s) < 0
for negative support), Endorsed Unanimity holds.
(iv) Familiar Monotonicity. It is straightforward to see that the output of
the Indirect aggregation function, which uses an expectation function,
depends only on the values on descendants and their relationships. So,
it is clear that a different opinion profile maintaining the same values
for descendants and their relationships will not change the output of
the function.
(v) Collective Coherence. To prove that it does not hold, it suffices to
find a DRF and an opinion profile for which there is no collective
coherence. Thus, consider the example depicted below in figure A.16.
Here vI(P )(s) = 1 and vI(P )(a) = −1 = vI(P )(b). Now, if we check
coherence for statement s, we obtain that |vI(P )(s) − eI(P )(s)| = 2 > 
for any  ∈ (0, 1), and hence collective coherence does not hold for this
profile.
s a b
v(a) = 1v(s) = 1 v(b) = −1
w(r1) = 1 w(r2) = 1
Figure A.16
(vi) Narrow Unanimity, Sided Unanimity and Weak Unanimity. Next we
build a DRF and an opinion profile for which Weak Unanimity does
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not hold despite satisfying the assumptions. Consider the example in
figure A.17 with opinion profile P = (O = (v, w)). Although v(s) = 1,
vI(P )(s) = −1 instead of greater than 0, and hence I does not satisfy
Weak unanimity. As discussed in section 5.2, an aggregation function
satisfying either Narrow Unanimity or Sided Unanimity also satisfies
Weak Unanimity. Thus, since Weak Unanimity does not hold, neither
do Narrow Unanimity and Sided Unanimity.
s a v(a) = −1v(s) = 1 w(r) = 1
Figure A.17
(vii) Monotonicity. Next we build a DRF and an opinion profile for which
Monotonicity does not hold despite satisfying the assumptions. Con-
sider the opinion profile in figures A.18 and A.19 for the same DRF .
The two profiles P = (O = (v, w)) and P ′ = (O′ = (v′, w′)) only differ
on the valuation of a: v(a) = 1 and v′(a) = −1.
Clearly, x = v(s) ≤ v′(s) = x, thus satisfying the assumptions of mono-
tonicity. However, since the aggregated valuations on s are: vI(P )(s) = 1
and vI(P ′)(s) = −1, it does not satisfy that vI(P ) ≤ vI(P ′), and hence
Monotonicity does not hold.
s a v(a) = 1v(s) = x
w(r) = 1
Figure A.18
s a v′(a) = −1v′(s) = x w
′(r) = 1
Figure A.19
(viii) Independence. Next we build a DRF and an opinion profile for which
Independence does not hold despite satisfying the assumptions. Con-
sider the opinion profiles P and P ′ in figures A.20 and A.21. Although
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v(s) = v′(s) for those profiles, the aggregated valuations on s do not
match: 1 = vI(P )(s) 6= vI(P ′)(s) = 0. Therefore, Independence does not
hold.
s a v(a) = 1v(s) = 1
w(r) = 1
Figure A.20
s a v′(a) = 0v′(s) = 1
w(r) = 1
Figure A.21
Proposition A.3. The aggregation function R satisfies the following prop-
erties:
(i) Collective Coherence;
(ii) Exhaustive Domain and Coherent Domain;
(iii) Anonymity and Non-Dictatorship;
And does not satisfy:
(iv) Narrow Unanimity, Sided Unanimity and Weak Unanimity;
(v) Endorsed Unanimity;
(vi) Familiar Monotonicity, so neither Monotonicity;
(vii) Independence.
Proof. (i) Collective Coherence. Since vR(P ) = eR(P ), the collective opinion
for R is exactly the result of applying the estimation function, and hence
collective coherence follows because |vR(P )(s)−eR(P )(s)| = 0 <  for any
 ∈ (0, 1) and any sentence s ∈ S.
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(ii) Exhaustive Domain and Coherent Domain. Straightforward.
(iii) Anonymity and Non-Dictatorship. Let P = (O1, . . . , On) be an opinion
profile over a DRF and σ a permutation over the agents in Ag =
{1, . . . , n}. We must show that R maintains the same collective opinion
over the permuted opinion profile P ′ = (Oσ(1), . . . , Oσ(n)), i.e. that
R(P ) = R(P ′).
We consider first the sentences s ∈ S with no descendants such that
R+(s) = ∅. Since these have no descendants, R computes the collec-
tive opinion on them using D. As shown by proposition A.1, since D
satisfies anonymity, it will also hold for R when considering sentences
with no descendants. Thus, since these sentences, which are used at the
beginning of the recursive process run by R, will not change through
permutations, the collective opinion over any sentence will be the same
after permutations. Therefore, anonymity holds for R, and from this
Non-Dictatorship.
(iv) Weak, Narrow and Sided Unanimity. The example of DRF depicted
in figure A.22 with opinion profile P = (O = (v, w)) will be enough
to show that R does not satisfy Weak unanimity. Although v(s) = 1,
and hence the assumptions for Weak Unanimity hold, vR(P )(s) = −1
influenced by the valuation on b. Since vR(P )(s) is not positive, Weak
unanimity does not hold for R, and consequently neither Side unanimity
nor Narrow unanimity.
s a b
v(a) = 1
v(s) = 1 v(b) = −1w(r1) = 1 w(r2) = 1
Figure A.22
(v) Endorsed Unanimity. Consider again the opinion profile depicted in
figure A.22. Clearly, since v(a) = 1, s has full positive support, but
vR(P )(s) = −1. Since vR(P )(s) is not positive, Endorsed Unanimity
does not hold.
(vi) Familiar Monotonicity and Monotonicity. We build a DRF and two
opinion profiles for which Familiar Monotonicity does not hold despite
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satisfying the assumptions. Consider the two opinion profiles P =
(O = (v, w)) and P ′ = (O′ = (v′, w′)) depicted in figures A.23 and A.24
respectively. Considering s, these two profiles satisfy the assumptions
of Familiar Monotonicity: v(s) ≤ v′(s) and the values on the indirect
opinion are the same. However, P and P ′ differ on the value on b: v(b) =
1 and v′(b) = −1. This leads to a change of value on the aggregated
value on s. Thus, vR(P )(s) 6≤ vR(P ′)(s), and R fails at satisfying Familiar
Monotonicity. By lemma 5.2, Monotonicity does not hold either.
s a b
v(a) = 1
v(b) = 1v(s) = x
w(r1) = 1 w(r2) = 1
Figure A.23
s a b
v′(a) = 1
v′(b) = −1v′(s) = x w
′(r1) = 1 w′(r2) = 1
Figure A.24
(vii) Independence. Straightforward from the example employed in proposi-
tion A.2 to prove lack of independence.
Next, we provide the proofs for the analysis of the families of α-balanced
aggregation functions {Bα}α∈(0,1) and α-recursive aggregation functions {Rα}α∈(0,1).
Before that, we first introduce some general lemmas that will be useful to
build the proofs of the propositions for both families. To ease notation, these
general lemmas that follow consider two generic aggregation functions F and
G, as well as a generic aggregation function H = αF + (1 − α)G instead of
vH(P ) = αvF (P ) + (1− α)vG(P ). Hereafter, the following lemmas establish
the social properties fulfilled by H.
Lemma A.1. Let F and G be two opinion aggregation functions satisfying
Exhaustive domain. For any α ∈ (0, 1), aggregation function H = αF + (1−
α)G also satisfies Exhaustive domain.
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Proof. Straightforward from the fact that both F and G satisfy Exhaustive
domain.
Lemma A.2. Let F and G two opinion aggregation functions satisfying
Anonymity over domain D . For any α ∈ (0, 1), aggregation function H =
αF + (1− α)G also satisfies Anonymity over domain D.
Proof. For any given opinion profile P and its permuted profile P ′, if F (P ) =
F (P ′) and G(P ) = G(P ′), then it follows that H(P ) = H(P ′).
Lemma A.3. Let F and G two opinion aggregation functions satisfying Fa-
miliar Monotonicity over domain D. For any α ∈ (0, 1), aggregation function
H = αF + (1− α)G also satisfies Familiar Monotonicity on domain D.
Proof. Let P = (O1 = (v1, w1), . . . , On = (vn, wn)) and P
′ = (O′1 = (v
′
1, w
′
1),
. . . , O′n = (v
′
n, w
′
n)) be a profile satisfying the assumptions of familiar mon-
tonicity for a statement s, i.e. vi(s) ≤ v′i(s) for any i and for any r ∈ R+(s)
then wi(r) = w
′
i(r) and vi(sr) = v
′
i(sr). Since F and G satisfy familiar mono-
tonicity, then vF (P )(s) ≤ vF (P ′)(s) and vG(P )(s) ≤ vG(P ′)(s). Thus, since
H = αF + (1− α)G, it follows directly that vH(P )(s) ≤ vH(P ′)(s), so familiar
montonicity holds for H.
Lemma A.4. Let F and G two opinion aggregation functions satisfying
Sided unanimity on domain D. For any α ∈ (0, 1), aggregation function
H = αF + (1− α)G also satisfies Sided unanimity on D.
Proof. Since Sided unanimity holds for F and G, we know that given any
opinion profile P of agents {1, . . . , n}, i.e. if for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n} vi(s) > 0
then vF (s) > 0 and vG(s) > 0, and since vH = αvF +(1−α)vG, it also follows
that vH(s) > 0. Likewise for the negative case, so Sided Unanimity holds for
H.
Lemma A.5. Let F and G two opinion aggregation functions satisfying
Weak unanimity on the domain D. For any α ∈ (0, 1), aggregation function
H = αF + (1− α)G also satisfies Weak unanimity over domain D.
Proof. Since Sided unanimity holds for F and G, we know that given any
opinion profile P of agents {1, . . . , n}, for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, if vi(s) = 1,
then vF (s) > 0 and vG(s) > 0. Since vH = αvF + (1 − α)vG, it also follows
that vH(s) > 0, and hence Weak Unanimity holds for H. Analogously for
the negative case.
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Lemma A.6. Let F and G two opinion aggregation functions satisfying
Endorsed unanimity on domain D. For any α ∈ (0, 1), aggregation function
H = αF + (1− α)G also satisfies Endorsed unanimity on D.
Proof. Since Endorsed unanimity holds for F and G, we know that given any
opinion profile P of agents {1, . . . , n}, for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and descendant
sr ∈ D(s) of sentence s, if vi(sr) > 1, then vF (s) > 0 and vG(s) > 0. Since
vH = αvF + (1 − α)vG, it also follows that vH(s) > 0, and hence Endorsed
Unanimity holds for H. Analogously for the full negative support case.
We are now ready to prove the results for α-balanced aggregation func-
tions in {Bα}α∈(0,1).
Proposition A.4. The family of α-balanced aggregation functions {Bα}α∈(0,1)
satisfies the following properties:
(i) Exhaustive Domain and Coherent Domain;
(ii) Anonymity and Non-Dictatorship;
(iii) Weak Unanimity for α > 1
2
;
(iv) Endorsed Unanimity for α < 1
2
;
(v) Familiar Monotonicity;
and does not satisfy:
(vi) Collective coherence;
(vii) Narrow Unanimity, nor Sided Unanimity;
(viii) Monotonicity;
(ix) Independence.
Proof. (i) Exhaustive Domain and Coherent Domain follow from proposi-
tions A.1 and A.2, and from lemma A.1.
(ii) Anonymity and Non-Dictatorship follow from propositions A.1 and A.2,
and from lemma A.2.
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(iii) Weak Unanimity. Let P = (O1, . . . , On) be an opinion profile over
a DRF for the agents in Ag = {1, . . . , n}, and s ∈ S a sentence
such that vi(s) = 1 for any i. By proposition A.1, we know that
Weak unanimity holds for the Direct aggregation function, and hence
vD(P )(s) =
1
n
∑
i∈Ag vi(s) = 1. Now we turn our attention to I, the in-
direct function. The worst scenario occurs when vI(P )(s) = −1 because
aggregating this value to vD(P )(s) might prevent that vBα(P )(s) > 0,
and thus that Weak unanimity holds. The DRF and an opinion profile
depicted in figure A.25 exemplifies this case.
s a v(a) = −1v(s) = 1 w(r) = 1
Figure A.25
Since vD(P )(s) = 1 and vI(P )(s) = −1, vBα(P )(s) = α− (1−α) = 2α−1.
Thus, if we set α so that α > 1
2
, then we ensure that vBα(P )(s) > 0, and
Weak unanimity holds. The proof is analogous for the negative case of
Weak unanimity.
(iv) Endorsed Unanimity. Let s be a sentence and P = (O1, . . . , On) an
opinion profile satisfying that vi(sr) = −1 for any agent i and de-
scendant sr ∈ D(s) of sentence s. In other words, s has full negative
support. It follows that vI(P )(s) = −1. Likewise for our proof for
Weak unanimity above, we consider the worst case, which would oc-
cur when vD(P )(s) = 1. Figure A.25 depicts a DRF and single-opinion
profile illustrating this case. Since vD(P )(s) = 1 and vI(P )(s) = −1,
vBα(P )(s) = α − (1 − α) = 2α − 1. Thus, if we set α so that α < 12 ,
then we ensure that vBα(P )(s) < 0, and Endorsed unanimity holds.
The proof is analogous for the positive case (full positive support) of
Endorsed unanimity.
(v) Familiar Monotonicity follows from propositions A.1 and A.2, and from
lemma A.3.
(vi) Collective coherence.To prove that it does not hold, it suffices to find a
DRF and an opinion profile for which there is no collective coherence.
Thus, consider the DRF with one-opinion profile depicted below in
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figure A.26. Computing the aggregations for the Direct and Indirect
functions, we have that vD(P )(s) = 1, vD(P )(a) = 0, and, vI(P )(s) = 0
and vI(P )(a) = −1. Therefore, vBα(P )(s) = α and vBα(P )(a) = (−1)(1−
α). And hence, the coherence at sentence s is: |vBα(P )(s)− eBα(P )(s)| =
|vBα(P )(s) − vBα(P )(a)| = 1. Thus, we conclude that, for any  ∈ (0, 1),
-coherence cannot be satisfied regardless of the value of α. Therefore,
Bα does not satisfy -coherence.
s a b
v(a) = 0
v(s) = 1 v(b) = −1w(r) = 1 w(r) = 1
Figure A.26
(vii) Sided Unanimity, Narrow Unanimity. To prove that neither of these
properties holds, it suffices to find a DRF and an opinion profile for
which there is no Sided unanimity. In particular, we will show that for
any α ∈ (0, 1) we can find a DRF and an opinion profile for which Sided
unanimity and Narrow Unanimity do not hold. Consider then the DRF
with single-opinion profile in figure A.27, where x ∈ (0, 1) is such that
0 < x < 1−α
α
. Since v(s) = x > 0, the assumptions for Sided unanimity
hold at sentence s. Now, since vD(P )(s) = x and vI(P )(s) = −1, it follows
that vBα(P )(s) = αx + (1− α)(−1) = αx + α − 1 < α 1−αα + α − 1 = 0.
Since vBα(P ) 6> 0, Sided unanimity fails at s, and as it is single-opinion
profile Narrow unanimity fails too. The proof goes analogously for the
negative case of Sided unanimity.
s a v(a) = −1v(s) = x w(r) = 1
Figure A.27
(viii) Monotonicity. It suffices to find a DRF and an opinion profile for which
there is no Monotonicity. Consider the two single-opinion profiles P and
P ′ over the very same DRF in figures A.28 and A.29. We will check
Monotonicity at sentence s, where the conditions for unanimity hold
because v(s) ≤ v′(s). Computing Bα we obtain that vBα(P )(s) = 1
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and vBα(P ′)(s) = 2α − 1. To fulfil Monotonicity both expressions must
satisfy that vBα(P )(s) ≤ vBα(P ′)(s), namely that 1 ≤ 2α−1. This is only
possible for α ≥ 1. Therefore, for any α ∈ (0, 1) Monotonicity does not
hold.
s a v(a) = 1v(s) = 1
w(r) = 1
Figure A.28
s a v′(a) = −1v′(s) = 1 w
′(r) = 1
Figure A.29
1 ≤ 2α− 1
(ix) Independence. For any α 6= 1, Bα does not fulfil Independence due to
its dependence on I.
Proposition A.5. The family of α-recursive aggregation functions {Rα}α∈(0,1)
satisfies the following properties:
(i) Collective Coherence for α < 
2
;
(ii) Exhaustive Domain and Coherent Domain;
(iii) Anonymity and Non-Dictatorship;
(iv) Weak Unanimity for α > 1
2
;
and does not satisfy:
(v) Sided unanimity, so neither Narrow Unanimity;
(vi) Endorsed Unanimity;
(vii) Familiar Monotonicity, so neither Monotonicity;
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(viii) Independence.
Proof. (i) Collective Coherence. Given  > 0 and a DRF, we must prove
that |vRα(P )(s) − eRα(P )(s)| <  for any sentence s ∈ S. First, we de-
velop the difference between valuation and estimation for the collective
opinion:
vRα(P )(s)− eRα(P )(s) = vRα(P )(s)−
∑
r∈R+(s)wRα(P )(r)vRα(P )(sr)∑
r∈R+(s)wRα(P )(r)
= [αvD(P )(s) + (1− α)vR(P )(s)]−
∑
r∈R+(s)wD(P )(r)
[
αvD(P )(sr) + (1− α)vR(P )(sr)
]∑
r∈R+(s)wRα(P )(r)
= α
[
vD(P )(s)−
∑
r∈R+(s)wRα(P )(r)vD(P )(sr)∑
r∈R+(s)wD(P )(r)
]
+
+ (1− α)[vR(P )(s)− ∑r∈R+(s)wR(P )(r)vR(P )(sr)∑
r∈R+(s)wR(P )(r)
]
= α
[
vD(P )(s)− eD(P )(s)
]
+ (1− α)[vR(P )(s)− eR(P )(s)]
= α(vD(P )(s)− eD(P )(s)).
Notice that we get rid of vR(P )(s) − eR(P )(s) because is zero. Now
the coherence of Rα directly depends on the coherence of the direct
aggregation function D and α. Figure A.30 depicts a DRF with a
single-opinion profile representing a worst-case scenario for D because
vD(P )(s)− eD(P )(s) = 2. Considering the coherence of Rα, we have that
|vRα(P )(s)− eRα(P )(s)| = α|vD(P )(s)− eD(P )(s)| ≤ 2α for any profile P .
Therefore, we must ensure that α < 
2
so that |vRα(P )(s)−eRα(P )(s)| < 
holds for any profile of the domain, and hence Collective coherence holds
for Rα.
s av(s) = 1 v(a) = −1w(r) = 1
Figure A.30
(ii) Exhaustive Domain and Coherent Domain directly follow from propo-
sitions A.1 and A.3 and lemma A.1.
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(iii) Anonymity and Non-Dictatorship follow directly from propositions A.1
and A.3 and lemma A.2.
(iv) Weak unanimity. To prove Weak unanimity we can resort to the proof
built to prove Weak unanimity for Bα in proposition A.4. We simply
have to substitute Bα for Rα.
(v) Sided Unanimity and Narrow Unanimity. To prove that neither of these
properties holds, it suffices to find a DRF and an opinion profile for
which there is no Sided unanimity (nor Narrow unanimity). Consider
the DRF and the single-opinion profile depicted in figure A.31, where
x ∈ (0, 1) is such that 0 < x < 1−α
α
. Since x > 0, the assumption for
Sided Unanimity holds at s. However, vRα(P )(s) is not positive, since
vRα(P )(s) = xα − 1 + α < 1−αα α − 1 + α = 0, and hence Sided (and
Narrow) unanimity does not hold.
s av(s) = x v(a) = −1w(r) = 1
Figure A.31
(vi) Endorsed Unanimity. Next we build a DRF and an opinion profile for
which Endorsed Unanimity does not hold. Consider the DRF and the
opinion profile P depicted in figure A.32. The assumptions for Endorsed
unanimity hold at s because s has full negative support. However,
vRα(P )(s) is not negative: since vD(P )(s) = 1 and vR(P )(s) = 1, we
obtain that vRα(P )(s) = 1 for any α ∈ (0, 1). Therefore, Endorsed
Unanimity does not hold.
s a b
v(a) = −1
v(s) = 1 v(b) = 1
w(r1) = 1 w(r2) = 1
Figure A.32
(vii) Familiar Monotonicity and Monotonicity. We build a DRF and an
opinion profile for which Familiar Monotonicity does not hold despite
satisfying the assumptions. Consider the DRF and single-opinion profile
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P in figure A.32 together with another single-opinion profile P ′ in figure
A.33. Clearly, the assumptions of Familiar Monotonicity are fulfilled
at s because vi(s) ≤ v′i(s) and the descendant of s has the same value.
However, we will show that vRα(P )(s) ≤ vRα(P ′)(s) is not true. For both
profiles we have that vD(P )(s) = vD(P ′)(s) = 1, and, vR(P )(s) = 1 and
vR(P ′)(s) = 1− x. Thus, for any α ∈ (0, 1): vRα(P )(s) = α+ (1−α) = 1
and vRα(P ′)(s) = α + (1 − α)(1 − x) = 1 − x(1 − α) < 1 for any
x ∈ (0, 1). Therefore, vRα(P )(s) > vRα(P ′)(s) and Familiar Monotonicity
is not satisfied. By lemma 5.2, Monotonicity does not hold either.
s a b
v′(a) = −1
v′(s) = 1 v′(b) = 1− x < 1w
′(r1) = 1 w′(r2) = 1
Figure A.33
(viii) Independence. Clearly, Rα will not fulfil Independence for any α 6= 1
because of its dependence on R.
A.2. Constrained opinion profiles: assuming consensus on acceptance degrees
This section relates to section 7.2, where we assume that opinion profiles
share consensus on their acceptance degrees on relationships, i.e. for each
relationship r ∈ R of a DRF all the agents agree on their acceptance degrees:
wi(r) = wj(r) ∀i, j ∈ Ag.
In previous section A.1, each proof and counterexample used to demon-
strate that an aggregation function does or does not satisfy a property uses
opinion profiles composed by one single agent. Thus, those proofs serve as
well in this section when assuming consensus on acceptance degrees. For this
reason, adding this assumption does not change any of the properties fulfilled
by the aggregation functions in the general case (table 3), and therefore there
are no further desirable properties gained in this scenario with respect to the
more general scenario thoroughly analysed in section A.1.
A.3. Constrained opinion profiles: assuming coherent profiles
This section corresponds to the results displayed in table 4 in section 7.3.
We prove the results regarding the social choice properties satisfied by the
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aggregation functions introduced in Section 6 when assuming the domain of
the aggregation functions to be -coherent for some  ∈ (0, 1). This means
that we consider that our aggregation functions take in coherent opinion
profiles.
Since in the previous section many properties have been proven for the
general case, we will not need to prove them again for this more restrictive
scenario. For each opinion aggregation function, we will prove only those
results regarding social choice properties that change by the addition of the
coherence assumption and disprove again, this time for coherent domains,
those properties which are yet not satisfied.
Proposition A.6. For any  ∈ (0, 1), D over an -coherent domain satisfies
Endorsed Unanimity.
Proof. Let s a statement in a DRF and R+(s) the set of relationships r from
s to its descendants sr. Let P be an -coherent profile for  ∈ (0, 1) with full
positive support on s, i.e. vi(sr) = 1 for any i and descendant sr ∈ D(s).
Then:
ei(s) =
1∑
r∈R+(s)wi(r)
∑
r∈R+(s)
vi(sr)wi(r) =
1∑
r∈R+(s)wi(r)
∑
r∈R+(s)
wi(r) = 1
By the -coherence of P we have that:
|vi(s)− ei(s)| <  =⇒ vi(s) > ei(s)−  = 1− .
Therefore, for any  ∈ (0, 1) we can ensure that vi(s) > 0 for any i and the
conditions for Sided Unanimity hold. Now, since D satisfies Sided Unanimity
(by proposition A.1), we obtain that vD(s) > 0, and hence D fulfils Endorsed
Unanimity.
Proposition A.7. D over a δ-coherent domain, where δ ∈ (0, 1), still does
not satisfy -Collective coherence for any  ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. Consider the DRF and δ-coherent opinion profile P depicted in figure
A.34 and any δ ∈ (0, 1). We will show that the collective opinion yield by
the direct function for this example is never -coherent for any  ∈ (0, 1).
Clearly, this profile is δ-coherent for any δ > 0. Computing the direct
function at s we obtain that: vD(P )(s) = −1, vD(P )(a) = 0 and wD(P )(r) = 12 .
Now, if we check collective coherence at s, we see that: |vD(P )(s)−eD(P )(s)| =
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| − 1 − 0| = 1 > . Thus, since 1 is larger than any  value that we take in
(0, 1), D does not satisfy -Collective coherence.
s a
v1(s) = −1
v2(s) = −1
v1(a) = 1
v2(a) = −1w1(r) = 0
w2(r) = 1
Figure A.34
Proposition A.8. For  ∈ (0, 1), I over an -coherent domain satisfies Weak
Unanimity.
Proof. Consider a DRF with a statement s ∈ S and P = (O1 = (v1, w1), . . . ,
On = (vn, wn)) an opinion profile such that vi(s) = 1 for every i. Hence, the
conditions for Weak unanimity hold. If the profile P is -coherent, where
 ∈ (0, 1), then we can conclude that for any i: 1 −  < ei(s) < 1 + , being
1−  > 0 for any  ∈ (0, 1). Now, computing vI at s we get:
vI(P )(s) =
1
n
∑
i
ei(s) >
1
n
∑
i
1−  > 0
Since vI(P )(s) > 0, Weak unanimity holds. The proof for the negative case
of Weak unanimity is analogous.
Proposition A.9. For any δ ∈ (0, 1), I over an δ-coherent domain still does
not satisfy -Collective coherence for any  ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. To prove that this property does not hold, it suffices to find a DRF
and an opinion profile for which there is no -Collective coherence. Consider
the DRF and opinion profile P in figure A.35. Clearly, opinions O1 and O2
of P are δ-coherent for any δ > 0. Now, we compute the indirect function for
all the statement: vI(P )(s) =
−1
2
, vI(P )(a) =
1
2
, vI(P )(b) = 0, and, wI(P )(r1) =
1
2
= wI(P )(r2). If we check coherence at s we see that:
|vI(P )(s)− eI(P )(s)| = |vI(P )(s)− vI(P )(a)| = |−1
2
− 1
2
| = 1 > .
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Thus, since 1 is larger that any  value that we take in (0, 1), I does not
satisfy -Collective coherence.
s a b
v1(s) = −1
v2(s) = −1 w1(r1) = 0
w2(r1) = 1
v1(a) = 1
v2(a) = −1
w1(r2) = 1
w2(r2) = 0
v1(b) = 1
v2(b) = −1
Figure A.35
Proposition A.10. For any  ∈ (0, 1), I over an -coherent domain still
does not satisfy:
(i) Sided Unanimity, and therefore Narrow Unanimity;
(ii) Monotonicity.
Proof. (i) Sided unanimity and narrow unanimity. To prove that these
properties not hold, it suffices to find a DRF and an opinion profile
for which there is no Sided unanimity. Consider the DRF and one-
opinion profile depicted in figure A.36 such that  ∈ (0, 1) and x, y such
that 0 < x < y < . The assumptions of Sided unanimity are fulfilled
at s. We check that the opinion in the profile is -coherent because
|v(s) − e(s)| = |x − y + | < . However, vI(P )(s) = y −  < 0, instead
of positive, and hence Sided Unanimity is not satisfied. As in previous
proofs, as the counterexample is a single-opinion, Narrow unanimity
does not hold either.
s a v(a) = y − v(s) = x w(r) = 1
Figure A.36
(ii) Monotonicity. To prove that it does not hold, it suffices to find a DRF
with opinion profiles satisfying the Monotonicity assumptions are satis-
fied, and yet Monotonicity is not. In fact, we will create a generic coun-
terexample for any -coherent domain. Consider the DRF = 〈S,R, τ〉
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depicted in figure A.37 with S = {s, a} and R = {r}. Also in the
figure, let P = ((v, w))) be an opinion profile of one single agent such
that v(s) = x, w(r) = 1, and v(a) = y >, where −1 < y < x < 1 and
0 < x− y < .
s a v(a) = yv(s) = x
w(r) = 1
Figure A.37
Since v(s)−eO(s) = v(s)−v(a), then the profile P is clearly -coherent,
and hence P ∈ C(DRF ). We compute the collective opinion using I
at s as: vI(P )(s) = eO(s) = v(a) = y.
Now, consider another profile P ′ = (O = (v′, w)) over the same DRF,
shown in figure A.38, such that v′(s) = x+ ω
3
and v′(s) = y− ω
3
, where
ω > 0, such that x − y + ω ≤ , x + ω
3
≤ 1 and y − ω
3
≥ −1.Clearly
v′(s) > v(s) and P is also -coherent, i.e.:
v(s)− eO′(s) = (x+ ω
3
)− (y − ω
3
) < .
Nonetheless, vI(P ′)(s) = eO′(s) = y−ω3 < y, which means that vI(P )(s) 6≤
vI(P ′)(s), and hence this example cannot satisfy Monotonicity for any
.
s a v′(a) = y − ω3v′(s) = x+ ω3
w(r) = 1
Figure A.38
Proposition A.11. For any  ∈ (0, 1) and considering the domain to be
-coherent, R does not fulfil the following properties:
(i) Weak Unanimity, neither Sided nor Narrow Unanimity;
(ii) Endorsed Unanimity;
(iii) Familiar Monotonicity, and therefore Monotonicity.
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Proof. (i) Weak Unanimity, Sided unanimity, Narrow unanimity. To prove
that neither of these properties hold, it suffices to build a DRF and
opinion profile to show that Weak Unanimity does not hold. This is
sufficient because Weak unanimity is a weaker case of Sided and Narrow
unanimity, proposition 5.1 tells us that Sided and Narrow unanimity
will not hold if Weak Unanimity does not. Consider the DRF and
opinion profile P = ((v, w)) in picture A.39 such that w(r) = 1 for
any relationship r ∈ R,  ∈ (0, 1) and δ ∈ (0, ) and m ∈ N so that
mδ ≥ 1 > (m− 1)δ.
s a1 · · · am−1 am
v(a1) = 1− δ
v(am−1) = 1− (m− 1)δ
v(am) = 1−mδ
v(s) = 1
Figure A.39
Clearly, the outcome of the recursive function at each sentence is ob-
tained from the value of the recursive function at the previous sentence,
i.e.:
vR(P )(am) = vR(P )(am−1) = ... = vR(P )(a1) = vR(P )(s),
which actually is the value v(am) = 1−mδ ≤ 0. So, this is an opinion
profile -coherent fulfilling the assumptions of Weak unanimity at sen-
tence s because v(s) = 1. However, the value of the recursive function
at s is negative. Therefore, R does not fulfil Weak unanimity.
(ii) Endorsed Unanimity. We build a DRF and opinion profile to show that
Endorsed unanimity does not hold from the example in the previous
proof. Figure A.40 shows our example, which extends the one in figure
A.39 with an additional sentence a. Since v(ai) − v(ai−1 = δ, likewise
in the proof above, we have an -coherent opinion profile. Since v(s) =
1 the assumption for Endorsed unanimity at a is satisfied, but since
v(a) = 1−mδ ≤ 0, Endorsed unanimity does not hold.
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sa a1 · · · am−1 am
v(a1) = 1− δ
v(am−1) = 1− (m− 1)δ
v(am) = 1−mδ
v(s) = 1
v(a) = x
Figure A.40
(iii) Familiar Monotonicity and Monotonicity. Consider the opinion profiles
P and P ′ over the same DRF depicted in figures A.41 and A.42 re-
spectively. Since v(s) = v(a) = v(b) = 1, P is -coherent. By setting
0 < x < , we also obtain that P ′ is -coherent. Therefore, both P
and P ′ are -coherent and the assumptions for familiar monotonicity
hold at s. However, since 1 = vR(P )(s) > vR(P ′)(s) = 1 − x, Familiar
monotonicity cannot hold. By lemma 5.2 Monotonicity does not hold
either.
s a b
v(a) = 1
v(s) = 1 v(b) = 1
w(r1) = 1 w(r2) = 1
Figure A.41
s a b
v′(a) = 1
v′(s) = 1 v′(b) = 1− xw
′(r1) = 1 w′(r2) = 1
Figure A.42
Proposition A.12. For any  ∈ (0, 1) and considering the domain to be
-coherent, then the family {Bα}α∈(0,1) satisfies:
(i) Weak Unanimity; and
(ii) Endorsed Unanimity.
Proof. (i) Weak Unanimity follows from propositions A.1, A.8 and A.5.
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(ii) Endorsed Unanimity follows from propositions A.2, A.6 and A.6.
Proposition A.13. For any δ ∈ (0, 1), Bα over a δ-coherent domain still
does not satisfy -Collective coherence for any  ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. First, we show that the -coherence condition for Bα depends on the
functions employed in its definition, namely on D and I:
|vBα(P )(s)− eBα(P )(s)| =
∣∣∣vBα(P )(s)− ∑r∈R+(s)
(
αvD(P )(rs) + (1− α)vI(P )(sr)
)
wD(P )(r)∑
r∈(R+(s)wD(P )(r)
∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣(α(vD(P )(s) + (1− α)(vI(P )(s))− (αeD(P )(s)) + (1− α)eI(P )(s)))∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣α(vD(P )(s)− eD(P )(s))+ (1− α)(vI(P )(s)− eI(P )(s))∣∣∣
Thus, since D and I do not satisfy -collective coherence for any δ-
coherent profile (by propositions A.7 and A.9 respectively), neither will Bα
satisfy the property for any α ∈ (0, 1). Indeed, consider for instance the
DRF and δ-coherent opinion profile P , with any δ ∈ (0, 1), in figure A.35 as
employed in proposition A.9. If we compute -collective coherence for Bα at
sentence s we obtain that:
|vBα(P )(s)− eBα(P )(s)| =
∣∣∣α(−1− 0) + (1− α)(−1
2
− 1
2
)
∣∣∣ = | − 1| = 1 > 
for any  ∈ (0, 1). So, Bα does not fulfill -coherence for any α ∈ (0, 1).
Proposition A.14. For any  ∈ (0, 1) and considering the domain to be
-coherent, Bα does not fulfil the following properties for any α ∈ (0, 1):
(i) Sided Unanimity and Narrow Unanimity;
(ii) Monotonicity; and
(iii) Independence.
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Proof. (i) Sided Unanimity. It suffices to build a DRF and an opinion
profile for which Sided unanimity does not hold for any values of α and
, where α,  ∈ (0, 1). The next counterexample serves too see that
Narrow unanimity fails too.
Consider the set A = {(x, y) ∈ (0, 1) | 0 < y <  and 0 < x < y −
αy}. We check first, that this set is actually not empty. For α ∈ (0, 1),
y − αy > 0, thus y > αy > 0. So for y ∈ (0, ), there are x ∈ (0, 1)
satisfying x < y − αy.
s a v(a) = x− yv(s) = x w(r) = 1
Figure A.43
Now, we consider the DRF and opinion profile depicted in figure A.43
where x and y are values from A, namely (x, y) ∈ A. Since |v(s) −
e(s)| = |x − (x − y)| = |y| < , the opinion profile in the figure is
-coherent, and satisfies the assumptions for Sided Unanimity at s be-
cause v(s) = x > 0. However,
vBα(P )(s) = αvD(P )(s) + (1− α)vI(P )(s)
= αx+ (1− α)(x− y)
= x− y + αy < 0
since (x, y) ∈ A. So, clearly this example shows that Sided Unanimity
does not hold for the family Bα in an -coherent profile.
(iv) Independence. For any α ∈ (0, 1), Bα does not fulfil Independence due
to its dependence on I.
(iii) Monotonicity. Straightforward from the fact that Bα does not fulfil
Independence for any α ∈ (0, 1) and from proposition 5.3.
Proposition A.15. For any δ ∈ (0, 1), Rα over a δ-coherent domain satisfies
-Collective coherence for α ≤ 
2
.
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Proof. As seen before in proposition A.3, the collective coherence of Rα en-
tirely depends on the collective coherence of D, i.e.:
|vRα(P )(s)− eRα(P )(s)| = α|vD(P )(s)− eD(P )(s)|
Thus, finding the worst case scenario for D will give us the condition on
α that ensures that Rα satisfies -collective coherence for any . Next, we
consider an example showing that |vD(P )(s) − eD(P )(s)| can be as close to 2
as wanted depending on the number of agents.
s av2(s) = 1
v1(s) = 1
v3(s) = 1
...
vm(s) = 1
w1(r1) = 1
w2(r1) = 0
w3(r1) = 0
...
wm(r1) = 0
v2(a) = −1
v1(a) = 1
v3(a) = −1
...
vm(a) = −1
Figure A.44
Let P be the δ-coherent opinion profile over a DRF depicted in figure
A.44, for any δ ∈ (0, 1). For any i > 1: vi(s) = 1, vi(a) = −1 and wi(r1) = 0;
whereas v1(s) = 1, v1(a) = 1 and w1(r1) = 1. We check the condition for
collective coherence at s to find that:
|vRα(P )(s)− eRα(P )(s)| = α(1 +
m− 2
m
) < 
if α < 
1+m−2
m
. Thus, by taking α < 
2
< 
1+m−2
m
we ensure that Rα satisfies
-coherence for the worst case. Therefore, for any δ-coherent opinion profile,
δ ∈ (0, 1), choosing α < 
2
will ensure that Rα satisfies -collective coherence
for any  ∈ (0, 1).
Proposition A.16. Let  ∈ (0, 1) such that the domain of Rα is an -
coherent domain, then the family {Rα}α∈(0,1) satisfies:
(i) Weak Unanimity for α > 1
2
; and
(ii) Endorsed unanimity for α > 1
2− .
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Proof. (i) Weak Unanimity. Consider a DRF with sentences S, P an opin-
ion profile over the DRF and s ∈ S a sentence such that vi(s) = 1 for
any agent i. We know that
vD(P )(s) =
1
n
∑
i∈Ag
vi(s) = 1.
Now we turn our attention to R, the Recursive function. We consider
the worst scenario for Rα, which happens when v(s) = 1 and vR(P )(s) =
−1. The DRF and profile depicted in figure A.22 above shows that,
in fact, this scenario exists with vD(P )(s) = 1 and vR(P )(s) = −1, and
hence vRα(P )(s) = α+(1−α)(−1) = 2α−1. To fulfil Weak unanimity, we
need that vRα(P )(s) > 0 holds, but we also know that vRα(P )(s) ≥ 2α−1.
Therefore, we can guarantee Weak Unanimity by choosing α > 1
2
. The
proof for the negative case of Weak Unanimity goes analogously.
(ii) Endorsed Unanimity. To prove this property we will build a customised
DRF and opinion profile to demonstrate the worst case that we can find
when fulfilling the assumptions of Endorsed unanimity.
Consider a DRF and let P = (O1 = (v1, w1), . . . , On = (vn, wn)) be an
-coherent profile with full positive support on statement s ∈ S.
First, we consider the worst case where vR(P )(s) = −1 can be achieved
when s has full positive support. Figure A.45 depicts a DRF and an
opinion profile illustrating this situation.
s a1 a2 · · · am−1 am
v(a1) = 1 v(a2) = 1− x
v(am−1) = 1− (m− 1)x
v(am) = −1
v(s) = 1
Figure A.45
By choosing 0 < x <  and m ∈ N such that mx > 2 ≥ (m − 1)x,
this example shows an -coherent profile where v(a1) = 1 (full positive
support) and vR(s) = −1. Next, we move to the general setting con-
sidered by the proof, an opinion profile with n agents, knowing that
the worst case for this property is possible. Since vi(sr) = 1 for any
descendant sr ∈ D(s) and any agent i, the estimation function on s will
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be ei(s) = 1 for any agent. Therefore, from the coherence condition at
s we conclude that
1−  < vi(s) < 1 + .
Consider that for every i, vi(s) = 1−δi such that 0 ≤ δi < . This clearly
satisfies the previous inequality. Now we take δ = maxi{δ1, . . . , δn} to
create a new opinion profile P ′ = (O′1 = (v
′
1, w1), . . . , O
′
n = (v
′
n, wn))
such that vi(a) = v
′
i(a) for a ∈ S \ {s} and v′i(s) = 1 − δ for any i.
Then, since D fulfils Monotonicity and Narrow unanimity, we know
that vD(P ′)(s) ≤ vD(P )(s) and vD(P ′)(s) = 1− δ respectively. And, from
the example in figure A.45 we know that for any -coherent opinion
profile vR(P )(s) ≥ −1. Therefore,
vRα(P )(s) = αvD(P )(s) + (1− α)vR(P )(s)
≥ αvD(P ′)(s) + (1− α)(−1)
= (1− δ)α− (1− α) = (2− δ)α− 1
So, if we set α ∈ (0, 1) so that (2−δ)α−1 > 0, Rα will satisfy Endorsed
Unanimity. Since δ < , as close as possible, imposing α ≥ 1
2− >
1
2−δ
the property is satisfied.
Proposition A.17. For any  ∈ (0, 1), and considering the domain to be
-coherent, Rα does not fulfil the following properties for any α ∈ (0, 1):
(i) Sided unanimity, and therefore Narrow unanimity;
(ii) Familiar Monotonicity, and therefore Monotonicity; and
(iii) Independence.
Proof. (i) Sided Unanimity and Narrow Unanimity. It suffices to build a
DRF and an opinion profile for which Sided Unanimity does not hold
for any α,  ∈ (0, 1).
Consider the DRF and opinion profile P depicted in figure A.46, where:
x ∈ (0, 1) is such that 0 < x < 1−α
α
, 0 < δ < ; m ∈ N satisfies
(m− 1)δ ≤ 1+ < mδ; and for any r ∈ R, w(r) = 1.
85
s a1 · · · am−1 am
v(a1) = x− δ
v(am−1) = x− (m− 1)δ
v(am) = −1
v(s) = x
Figure A.46
Clearly, P is an -coherent because |v(am) − e(am)| = 0, and for any
i < m, |v(ai) − e(ai)| = v(ai) − v(ai+1) = δ < , and |v(s) − e(s)| =
x − x + δ < . Furthermore, P satisfies the assumptions of Sided
unanimity at s since v(s) = x > 0. It is straightforward to see that
vD(P )(s) = x and vR(P )(s) = vR(P )(am) = −1. Hence, vRα(P )(s) =
xα + (1− α)(−1) = xα + α − 1. But since x < 1−α
α
, we conclude that
vRα(P )(s) <
1−α
α
α+α− 1 = 0. This proves that Sided unanimity is not
fulfilled, and as it is a single-opinion profile Narrow unanimity fails too.
We can proceed analogously for the negative case of Sided Unanimity.
(ii) Familiar monotonicity. The counterexample employed in proposition
A.11 to show that Familiar monotonicity does not hold for R serves
here as well to prove that Rα does not satisfy Familiar monotonicity for
any α ∈ (0, 1). From opinion profiles P and P ′ depicted in figures A.41
and A.42 respectively, we extract that vD(P )(s) = vD(P ′)(s) = 1 and
1 = vR(P )(s) > vR(P ′)(s) = 1− x. Therefore, it follows that vRα(P )(s) >
vRα(P ′)(s), hence proving that Familiar monotonicity does not hold.
(iii) Independence. For any α ∈ (0, 1), function Rα does not fulfil Indepen-
dence due to its dependence on R.
A.4. Constrained opinion profiles: assuming Consensus on acceptance de-
grees and coherent profiles
Next, we show the results regarding our fourth, and last, scenario. We
now assume that opinion profiles are both -coherent, for some  ∈ (0, 1),
and agree on their acceptance degrees over relationships. The results that
follow are summarised in table 5 in section 7.4.
Likewise in previous sections, next we only prove per aggregation function
those properties that either were partially satisfied or not satisfied at all in
previous scenarios, but do hold in this new scenario. We do not prove those
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properties for which the proofs in the previous sections serves as well for this
scenario.
Proposition A.18. Let be a DRF and an opinion profile P = (O1, . . . , On).
For any s ∈ S, assume that for each r ∈ R+(s) wi(r) = λr ∈ (0, 1] for any i,
then:
(i) For any  ∈ (0, 1), if 0 < δ ≤  and the domain D is δ-coherent then
D(P ) is -coherent, so satisfies -Collective coherence.
(ii) For any  ∈ (0, 1), if 0 < δ ≤  and the domain D is δ-coherent then
I(P ) is -coherent, so satisfies -Collective coherence.
(iii) For any  ∈ (0, 1), if 0 < δ ≤  and the domain D is δ-coherent then
Bα(P ) is -coherent for any α ∈ (0, 1), so satisfies -Collective coher-
ence.
(iv) For any  ∈ (0, 1), if 0 < δ ≤  and the domain D is δ-coherent then
Rα(P ) is -coherent for any α ∈ (0, 1), so satisfies -Collective coher-
ence.
Proof. (i) Collective Coherence of D. Let s ∈ S. We assume that for any
i, |vi(s)− ei(s)| < δ ≤ . Next we calculate the coherence condition for
D at sentence s:
|vD(P )(s)− eD(P )(s)| =
∣∣∣∣∣ 1n∑
i
vi(s)− 1∑
r∈R+(s)wD(P )(r)
∑
r∈R+(s)
wD(P )(r)vD(P )(sr)
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣ 1n∑
i
vi(s)− 1∑
r∈R+(s) λr
∑
r∈R+(s)
λr
( 1
n
∑
i
vi(sr)
)∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣ 1n∑
i
(
vi(s)− 1∑
r∈R+(s)wi(r)
∑
r∈R+(s)
wi(r)vi(sr)
)∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣ 1n∑
i
(
vi(s)− ei(s)
)∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1n∑
i
∣∣∣vi(s)− ei(s)∣∣∣
Thus, by δ-coherence of the domain we obtain that:
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|vD(P )(s)− eD(P )(s)| ≤ 1
n
∑
i
∣∣∣vi(s)− ei(s)∣∣∣ < 1
n
∑
i
δ ≤ 
This proves that the collective opinion by D is -coherent.
(ii) Collective Coherence of I. We prove collective coherence for I similarly
to the proof above for D. Let s ∈ S. We assume that for any i,
|vi(s) − ei(s)| < δ ≤ . We compute the condition for the collective
coherence of I at sentence s as follows:
|vI(P )(s)− eI(P )(s)| =
∣∣∣∣∣ 1n∑
i
ei(s)− 1∑
r∈R+(s)wI(P )(r)
∑
r∈R+(s)
wI(P )(r)vI(P )(sr)
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣ 1n∑
i
ei(s)− 1∑
r∈R+(s) λr
∑
r∈R+(s)
λr
( 1
n
∑
i
ei(sr)
)∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣ 1n∑
i
(
ei(s)− 1∑
r∈R+(s)wi(r)
∑
r∈R+(s)
wi(r)ei(sr)
)∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣ 1n∑
i
∑
r∈R+(s)wi(r)vi(sr)−
∑
r∈R+(s)wi(r)ei(sr)∑
r∈R+(s)wi(r)
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣ 1n∑
i
∑
r∈R+(s)
wi(r)
(
vi(sr)− ei(sr)
)
∑
r∈R+(s)wi(r)
∣∣∣∣∣
So, by δ-coherence of the domain, we obtain that:
|vD(P )(s)− eD(P )(s)| ≤ 1
n
∑
i
∑
r∈R+(s)
wi(r)
∣∣∣vi(sr)− ei(sr)∣∣∣∑
r∈R+(s)wi(r)
<
1
n
∑
i
∑
r∈R+(s)wi(r) δ∑
r∈R+(s)wi(r)
=
1
n
∑
i
δ = δ ≤ 
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This proves that the collective opinion by I is -coherent.
(iii) Collective Coherence of Bα. We have just proven that D and I satisfy
-collective coherence assuming consensus on acceptance degrees and a
δ-coherent domain with δ < . It directly follows that for any α ∈ (0, 1),
then Bα on a δ-coherent domain also satisfies -collective coherence.
(iv) Collective Coherence of Rα. We have just proven that D satisfies -
collective coherence assuming consensus on acceptance degrees and a
δ-coherent domain. -collective coherence also holds for R under the
same assumptions following proposition A.3 (see collective coherence
for R). Hence, it follows that for any α ∈ (0, 1), Rα on a δ-coherent
domain also satisfies -collective coherence.
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